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Abstract 
Mandatory municipal energy benchmarking for commercial buildings are a novel form of policy 
emerging across cities in the United States. These benchmarking policies require the owners of covered 
buildings to report on energy consumption to a targeted group of stakeholders with the goal of attaining 
a variety of benefits including reduced greenhouse gas emissions, more efficient real estate markets, 
and energy savings for rate-payers. Energy benchmarking policies are rooted in new governance 
literature in which non-state actors adopt some or all of the decision-making authority of government, 
and targeted information disclosure literature which seeks to stimulate specific policy outcomes by 
incorporating new information into the decision-making process of both the targeted company and 
information consumers.  
Early research on municipal energy benchmarking policies for commercial buildings has focused on the 
underlying reporting frameworks for benchmarking and minimal research has yet to examine the 
interplay between the many components of an energy benchmarking policy—everything from the size 
of building that is covered by the policy, to the disclosure trigger and penalty for non-compliance. The 
primary objective of this study is to assess whether the design of benchmarking policies conform to the 
expectations of new governance and targeted information disclosure theories. The principal approach 
employed within this thesis is that of comparative policy analysis with documentary analysis of seven 
active municipal benchmarking policies in the United States. This study concludes with an analysis of the 
gap between theory and practice, refinement of the theories that explain benchmarking, and 
highlighting of opportunities to improve the practice of early adopters. 
This study finds that while differences in design exist between the individual policies, energy 
benchmarking policies do largely align with the expectations of new governance and targeted 
information disclosure theories.  
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Chapter 1 - Introduction and Overview 
1.1 - Mandatory Energy Disclosure as a Tool for Attaining Energy Efficiency Targets 
In the United States, commercial buildings represented approximately one-fifth of the country’s total 
energy consumption in 2010. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the American Council for 
an Energy-Efficient Economy have found that cost-effective energy retrofits could create savings of up to 
10% (Cox, Brown & Sun, 2013), while the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007) notes that 
energy efficiency “encompasses the most diverse, largest and most cost-effective mitigation 
opportunities in buildings” (para. 3). However, notwithstanding these opportunities, it has been noted 
that “despite the availability of new technologies and practices to increase energy efficiency, few are 
being implemented to scale” (National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy & Sustainable 
Development Technology Canada, 2009, p. 3). This discrepancy between cost-effective energy efficiency 
potential and the actual energy consumption of buildings has led policy-makers in the US to explore new 
tools to drive energy efficiency and conservation.  
One such tool is that of mandatory energy disclosures—more recently termed energy benchmarking1—
which was first demonstrated in Denmark with the launch of a rating system for commercial buildings in 
1992 to “facilitate compliance with energy efficiency standards, inform the planning process for public 
programs and resources, and stimulate a market response to relative efficiency in buildings” (Leipziger, 
2013, p. 6). These policies differ greatly in their structure but, at their core, require a building owner or 
manager to disclose energy consumption to designated stakeholders2 who otherwise would not have 
access to this information. Since 2002, energy benchmarking policies for commercial buildings have 
spread to Brazil, China, Australia, and 24 US states and cities (Leipziger, 2013).  
The EPA’s ENERGY STAR Commercial Buildings Program has developed a web platform and methodology 
for reporting consumption entitled Portfolio Manager which has become the industry standard for 
                                                          
1 Throughout this thesis “energy benchmarking” is meant to be understood as referring to a municipal-level policy 
that mandates energy disclosure from both public and private-commercial buildings. This use of the term energy 
benchmarking is distinct from voluntary or opt-in policies, and from benchmarking policies that only cover the 
corporate energy consumption of a municipality. These policies cover commercial buildings, and not residential or 
industrial building types.   
 
2 The terms “stakeholder”, “information consumer”, and “consumer” are used interchangeably in this thesis. The 
terms refer to an individual, community, organization, or government which has a direct interest in the 
improvement of the disclosed impact. This direct interest could be a utility which offers incentives to lower energy 
consumption to defer the need to develop new electricity generating capacity.  
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benchmarking in the US, and is employed by all energy benchmarking policies in the country. The EPA 
reports that in 2007 alone, the voluntary use of this program was responsible for reducing energy 
consumption by 78.3 billion kWh and greenhouse gas emissions by 18 megatonnes. These reductions 
are equivalent to removing 12.1 million passenger vehicles off the road annually (Council of Energy 
Ministers, 2009).  
While ENERGY STAR is administered federally, benchmarking policies in the US, which require buildings 
to disclose energy consumption, are enacted at the state and municipal-level (Cox et al., 2013). 
Generated using the Institute for Market Transformation’s BuildRating.Org policy comparison tool, Table 
1 lists the 18 enacted benchmarking policies in the U.S as of December 31st, 2015 (Institute for Market 
Transformation, n.d.). A significant majority (83%) of the benchmarking policies have been created at 
the municipal-level, with nearly half (44%) recently enacted in 2014 or 2015. Data from these 
benchmarking policies are beginning to come in, most notably in New York City where 2014 data was 
reported for over 828 million square feet of private sector offices, retail stores, hotels, warehouses, 
educational facilities, and other non-residential building types (New York City, 2014). The results suggest 
that if the bottom half of reporting buildings could be brought to just the median level of energy 
performance, energy consumption and GHG emissions of these buildings would fall by 18% and 20%, 
respectively. Such an effort would reduce total citywide greenhouse gases by 9% (Cox et al., 2013).   
Table 1. U.S. Jurisdictions with Mandatory Energy Benchmarking Policies for Commercial Buildings as of December 31st, 2015 
(Institute for Market Transformation, n.d.) 
 Jurisdiction Enactment Date 
M
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
y 
AUSTIN 2008 
NEW YORK CITY 2009 
SAN FRANCISCO 2011 
PHILADELPHIA 2012 
SEATTLE 2012 
BOSTON 2013 
CHICAGO 2013 
MINNEAPOLIS 2013 
CAMBRIDGE 2014 
MONTGOMERY COUNTY 2014 
ATLANTA 2015 
BERKELEY 2015 
BOULDER 2015 
KANSAS CITY MO 2015 
PORTLAND 2015 
S t a t e / D i s t r i c t DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 2008 
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WASHINGTON 2009 
CALIFORNIA 2015 
The quick growth in adoption of benchmarking policies demonstrates the desire of policymakers to 
experiment with alternative governance arrangements in order to achieve policy goals across a complex 
and decentralized building stock. However, in these early days a template for the design of a 
benchmarking policy has yet to emerge and there exists significant differences in how the jurisdictions 
leading in the adoption of benchmarking have structured the policies. What types of buildings should be 
required to report? What combination of incentives should a jurisdiction employ? How should civil 
society, associations, and the public more broadly be engaged? These are some of the questions that 
confront jurisdictions during policy design.  
This study will examine the design of benchmarking policies and the process by which these elements 
are selected.  
1.2 - Research Objectives and Questions 
Energy benchmarking policies in the US lend themselves to comparative study because they all employ 
the same ENERGY STAR methodology and Portfolio Manager reporting tool, but select different 
approaches—or policy components—when designing the ordinances. This thesis defines a “policy 
component” as a variable which an enacting jurisdiction can independently determine while still 
participating within the ENERGY STAR framework and using the Portfolio Manager web platform. 
Examples of policy components include the type and severity of the penalty for noncompliance, or the 
size of building mandated to disclose data. The interaction between policy components adds an 
additional layer of complexity that must be considered to inform and understand policy design. Whereas 
the ENERGY STAR methodology is set, stakeholders are able to assert influence and policy-makers 
render design decisions that shape the ultimate utility of benchmarking locally at the policy component 
level.  
The primary objective of this study is to assess whether the selection of benchmarking policy 
components conforms to the expectations of new governance and targeted information disclosure 
theories which describe the ability of information to achieve a desired impact by empowering non-state 
actors to assume some of the decision-making authority of government.  This analysis of the gap 
between theory and practice will contribute to both refining the theories that explain benchmarking, 
and highlighting opportunities to improve the practice of early adopters. To advance this objective, the 
following questions will be considered: 
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Question #1: Which policy components does theory suggest that jurisdictions should select? 
Question #2: Which policy components do jurisdictions select and are there apparent trends? 
Question #3: How does the selection of policy components in active jurisdictions compare 
against theoretical expectations?  
 A secondary objective is to begin to reconcile the gap between theory and practice.  To advance this 
objective, the following question will be explored: 
Question #4: How does benchmarking advance an understanding of new governance and 
information disclosure theories?  
1.3 – Theoretical and Practical Contributions 
Existing literature which directly addresses energy benchmarking policies in U.S. municipalities (see 
Table 2 for a summary) focuses on the statistical methods used, the impact of disclosure policies on 
residential markets, or the effectiveness of these policies in general at increasing energy efficiency. A 
notable exception is Cox et al. (2013) which explores the conservation potential of municipal energy 
benchmarking policies in the US. However, no academic research, including Cox et al., has been found 
that examines the interplay between the many components of an energy benchmarking policy—
everything from the size of building that is covered by the policy, to the disclosure trigger and penalty 
for non-compliance.  
Table 2. The research focus of existing literature exploring U.S. municipal energy benchmarking 
Research Focus Source 
Analysis of benchmarking 
rating systems & statistical 
methods 
(Nikolaou, Kolokotsa, & Stavrakakis, 
2011) 
(Hsu, 2014) 
(Chung, 2011) 
Potential of benchmarking 
broadly or on residential 
markets 
(Cox et al., 2013) 
(Markard & Holt, 2003) 
(Brounen & Kok, 2011) 
High-level case study (Cahill, 2012) 
(Mattern, 2013) 
(Boardman & Palmer, 2007) 
Quantitative analysis of 
building performance 
(Kontokosta, 2012a) 
(Hsu, 2012) 
(Kontokosta, 2012b) 
Effectiveness of policies 
generally at increasing 
energy efficiency 
(Eiholtz, 2009) 
(Fuerst, 2009) 
(Miller, 2008) 
(Uchida, 2007) 
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(Zhu & Zhang, 2012) 
U.S. benchmarking policy-
specific 
(Cox et al., 2013) 
This thesis’ novel focus on the policies themselves seeks to contribute to the literature by understanding 
how the design decisions of municipal policy-makers impact the utility of energy benchmarking policies. 
While the literature on U.S. municipal benchmarking policies specifically is sparse, there is a large body 
of knowledge exploring other forms of targeted information disclosure such as energy use in appliances 
and toxic substance releases from industry. Disclosure theory will be applied to the structure of 
benchmarking policies, utilizing the gap between theory and practice as a lens by which to explore the 
suitability of current theory in describing the design of benchmarking policies, and to assess emerging 
trends.  
In addition to the theoretical contributions of this thesis, this topic is of interest to policy makers who 
are seeking to improve an existing benchmarking policy, or to implement a new law or ordinance. For 
example, of the seven benchmarking policies included in the dataset for this thesis, six implemented an 
amendment to their ordinance. This thesis can support the further evolution of benchmarking policies. 
1.4 – Thesis Outline 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. Following this introduction in Chapter One, Chapter Two 
describes the research design, data availability and limitations, and methods. The population of 
benchmarking policies is screened to create a sample representing municipal policies with reported 
data. The policy components by which benchmarking policies are to be examined are put forward. Data 
sources are presented and categorized by the chapter in which it is used. 
Chapter Three presents the Theoretical Framework for Mandatory Energy Benchmarking within 
Commercial Real-Estate, beginning with new governance as a theory which describes the increasing 
prevalence of “self-organizing, interorganizational networks [that] complement markets and hierarchies 
as governing structure for authoritatively allocating resources and exercising control and co-ordination” 
(Rhodes, 1996, p. 1). Building upon this base, market failures relevant to the commercial real-estate 
sector—namely information asymmetries, split incentives, and the agent-principal problem—are 
explored to demonstrate the need for corrective intervention. The appropriate policy response to these 
market failures is proposed by new governance literature to be information disclosure for its ability to 
alter purchasing decision-making and subsequently drive an increase in a targeted aspect of producer 
performance to meet shifting demand. Mandatory energy disclosure regimes are put forward as the 
6 
 
procedural mechanism for enacting information disclosure. This chapter answers Question #1: which 
policy components does theory suggest that jurisdictions should select? 
Chapter Four briefly recounts the history, development, and impact of the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s ENERGY STAR Portfolio Manager. A summary of ENERGY STAR’s methodological approach 
provides a deeper understanding of both the strengths and weaknesses of the platform, as well as its 
performance as a management decision-making tool. This knowledge is important when considering 
why a given policy may not align with the theoretical expectations of information disclosure tools more 
generally, and to assess the EPA’s role within a benchmarking policy.  
Chapter Five uses annual benchmarking reports and policy documents from the sample cities, gray 
literature, and academic literature to create case studies of Active Municipal Benchmarking Policies. As 
in Chapter Three, the approaches taken by municipalities are aligned with the policy components. 
Trends are identified in policy component selection. This chapter answers Question #2: which policy 
components do jurisdictions select and are there apparent trends? 
In Chapter Six, Results and Conclusions, the remaining research objectives and questions of this thesis 
are addressed. The theoretical expectations of Chapter 3 and the applied practice of Chapter 5’s sample 
cities are compared to answer Question #3: how does the selection of policy components in active 
jurisdictions compare against theoretical expectations? It is found that the theory accurately describes 
much of the policy design, but fails to fully capture the stated policy objectives and is unable to account 
for variances driven by local context. Next, this chapter uses the research results as a lens by which to 
comment on key debates in the literature and to address Question #4: How does benchmarking advance 
an understanding of new governance and information disclosure theories? This thesis concludes with 
recommendations for future research. A key recommendation is the standardization of city-level 
reporting on the performance of benchmarking policies to allow for national comparisons and learning.  
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Chapter 2 – Methodology 
2.1 – Research Design 
When designing this research study, the original intent was to conduct quantitative analysis of 
longitudinal benchmarking data in order to objectively test energy benchmarking policy theories “by 
examining the relationship among variables” (Creswell, 2013, p. 4). However, it was quickly discovered 
that both the data and the theories lacked sufficient maturity to use a quantitative methodology. 
Instead, a qualitative approach was called for which could leverage case studies and observed 
behaviour—in this instance built upon the primary sources of ordinances and reports. 
The thesis reviews new governance and targeted information disclosure literature to form a framework 
for deductively analyzing the design decisions of the sample policies. Theory is used to select the policy 
component categories (see 2.2 – Policy Components) and then these policy components are explained 
by theory in Chapter 3. In this way, a hypothesized theoretical expectation is created for the selection of 
the policy components of an energy benchmarking policy.  
The policy component selection of the sample policies (see Chapter 5) are observed using document 
analysis, an approach for systematically reviewing and evaluating documents (Bowen, 2009). The sample 
policies represent distinct policy environments—each operating under the jurisdiction of a different 
state, and governed by different locally enacted policies—by which to comparatively analyze policy 
component selection. This comparative analysis is used to identify a trend (explained in 2.5 - Research 
Methods) of policy component selection within the sample policies.  Finally, the trend is compared 
against the hypothesized theoretical expectation. 
The methods for this thesis are described in 2.5 – Research Methods.  
2.2 – Data Availability and Limitations 
It was noted in the previous chapter that current academic research into topics relating to 
benchmarking has not addressed policy design, but rather focuses on statistical methods, general 
effectiveness of policies, or building-level analysis of performance. This can be explained in part by data 
deficiencies resulting from the short operating time of benchmarking policies, poor data quality, and an 
inability to directly compare benchmarking policies. To illustrate the data challenges that confronted this 
thesis, the following list compares the strength of data available to researchers analyzing ENERGY STAR 
as a methodology, with the relative weakness of data available to researchers analyzing energy 
benchmarking policies that mandate reporting using ENERGY STAR: 
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 Operating Length: The ENERGY STAR’s Commercial Building Program which provides the platform 
and methodology for benchmarking policies has been in operation since 1999. However, as was 
shown in Table 1, the oldest benchmarking policy in the U.S. was enacted in 2008, and 44% have 
been created since 2014. Seattle’s Office of Sustainability and Environment (2014) explains that 
“given that implementing efficiency upgrades in buildings can take up to five years, it is likely that 
actual decreases in annual building [data] may take years to show up in individual or overall building 
energy performance results” (p. 35). It may be several more years before benchmarking policies 
have produced enough data to directly assess their effectiveness. 
 Data Quality: ENERGY STAR employs a statistically robust national building survey at its core 
(detailed in 4.4 - ENERGY STAR Methodology and Portfolio Manager) and its Portfolio Manager tool 
presently tracks the performance of over 400,000 commercial buildings across the U.S. representing 
40% of the market. In contrast, even for the oldest benchmarking policies—New York and Seattle—
improper data entry by building owners has in some cases disqualified large amounts of available 
benchmarking data (Northeast Energy Efficiency Partnerships, 2013). 
 Comparability: Each city discloses different information (ex. compliance rates, building owner 
surveys) about its benchmarking policy which makes direct comparison difficult. The very nature of 
ENERGY STAR as a standardized repository of data allows for comparative analysis between 
buildings (see Chapter 5 – Active Municipal Benchmarking Policies). A significant opportunity exists 
for the standardization of program-level data from jurisdictions with benchmarking policies.  
Since long-term analysis of both qualitative and quantitative data is simply not possible at this early 
stage for the aforementioned reasons, this thesis instead relies upon the analysis of the following 
primary documents and reports to understand the implementation of benchmarking policies within 
each jurisdiction:  
 Policy documents: These documents include the ordinance, statute, or law—and any associated 
amendments and design documents—which mandates and governs the benchmarking policy. 
Policy documents dictate many of the policy components, including the type and size of 
buildings required to benchmark, and penalties for non-compliance. 
 Self-reported results: Annual reports by the municipalities are important sources of publicly 
available self-reported results and discussions of the success of the jurisdiction’s commercial 
benchmarking program.  The self-reported results include data on rates of compliance, observed 
changes in consumption, feedback from building owners, and opportunities for improvement. 
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These primary sources will be complimented by gray literature from organizations such as the EPA and 
the Institute for Market Transformation, which have led the public conversation through the creation of 
reports, implementation guides, and practitioner interviews.  
In addition to the literature which will provide the theoretical underpinnings of this thesis, some existing 
literature includes insights which advance an understanding of the components. For example, in 
reviewing data from New York City’s Local Law 84, Hsu (2012) found that “a small number of consultants 
were responsible for a large proportion of the benchmarked buildings”, and that many of these 
consultants improperly entered data (p. 6).  This could have implications for how data is entered into the 
tools, whether data entry is automated, and training and certification for consultants. 
2.3 – Screening for Active Jurisdictions 
For the purposes of this study, it is important to screen the population of jurisdictions with a 
benchmarking policy in order to isolate a sample that is manageable, comparable, and has sufficient 
data for analysis. For example, Table 1 showed that of the 18 municipal and state jurisdictions with a 
benchmarking policy, 44% had been enacted since 2014. As previously mentioned, benchmarking 
policies normally have a phasing-in period which means that it can take several years before a 
municipality begins to report data from commercial buildings, and then several more before it can 
meaningfully reflect on the degree to which the policy has met its intended goals.  
The scoping requirements listed in Table 3 were applied to the population of 18 jurisdictions with a 
benchmarking policy in order to create the sample. Jurisdictions were included in the sample only if they 
are operated municipally, have publicly available reports, and require disclosure from commercial 
buildings.  
Table 3.  Scoping Requirements for Creation of Research Sample 
Requirement Justification 
Municipally-run 84% of benchmarking policies are municipally-run. States and municipalities 
may not be directly comparable because of geographic, legal, and capacity 
differences.  
Availability of 
Reporting 
Municipally-produced reports are relied upon for this thesis. Publicly accessible 
annual reports must be available for comparison across jurisdictions. Without 
at least one year of publicly disclosed data and an annual report, it is 
considered unlikely that sufficient information exists in the public sphere to 
allow for critical analysis of the interplay between policy components. For 
example, Kansas City, Missouri, enacted a benchmarking policy in 2015 which 
will require public buildings to report in 2016, some commercial buildings to 
report in 2017, and will require all covered buildings to report by 2018 (Insitute 
10 
 
for Market Transformation, 2014). The first report including lessons from 
commercial building reporting will likely not be available until the fall of 2018. 
 
Time intensive qualitative analysis of policy documents and annual reports was 
used extensively for this thesis, necessitating a firm end-point to data 
collection. An annual report must have been accessible as of October 31st, 
2014. This date was chosen to align with the reporting dates of several 
jurisdictions, as well as the requirements of this thesis process. 
Commercial 
Disclosure Begun 
Policies are often phased in by only requiring reporting from municipally-owned 
buildings in the first years of implementation to provide time for building 
owners to comply with requirements to obtain data (Mattern, 2013, p. 500).  
Influence of policies on management decision-making is central to information 
disclosure theory and it is considered unlikely that government disclosure can 
provide a suitable proxy. 
In Table 4, the population of 18 jurisdictions with enacted ordinances are compared against the scoping 
requirements to identify the research sample. Once again, the Institute for Market Transformation’s 
BuildingRating.org’s policy comparison tool was used to generate the list of jurisdictions as it is the 
leading repository for information on US benchmarking policies, and works closely with both the EPA 
and municipalities. Policies are grouped into the categories of “in scope” if they meet the scoping 
requirements, or “out of scope” if they do not. After screening the jurisdictions there remain seven in 
scope benchmarking policies which will make up the sample for this research. Each of these cities has at 
least one annual report that details the self-evaluated performance of a commercial building 
benchmarking policy. 
Table 4. Identification of Research Sample 
With data from Institute for Market Transformation (n.d.) 
 Jurisdiction Enactment Date 
Municipally-
Run 
Availability 
of 
Reporting 
Commercial 
Disclosure 
Begun 
In
 S
co
p
e
 
AUSTIN 2008 Yes Yes Yes 
NEW YORK CITY 2009 Yes Yes Yes 
SAN FRANCISCO 2011 Yes Yes Yes 
PHILADELPHIA 2012 Yes Yes Yes 
SEATTLE 2012 Yes Yes Yes 
BOSTON 2013 Yes Yes Yes 
CHICAGO 2013 Yes Yes Yes 
O
u
t 
o
f 
Sc
o
p
e
 
MINNEAPOLIS 2013 Yes No Yes 
CAMBRIDGE 2014 Yes No No 
MONTGOMERY COUNTY 2014 Yes No No 
ATLANTA 2015 Yes No No 
BERKELEY 2015 Yes No No 
BOULDER 2015 Yes No No 
KANSAS CITY MO 2015 Yes No No 
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PORTLAND 2015 Yes No No 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 2008 No Yes Yes 
WASHINGTON 2009 No No Yes 
CALIFORNIA 2015 No No No 
2.4 – Policy Components 
No formal identification of policy components exists either academically or by the EPA to describe 
benchmarking policy design. For guidance, this thesis relies upon more general characteristics identified 
by disclosure literature, as well as the categories used by civil society advocates (listed in Table 5).  
Graham & Miller define transparency policies as sharing the characteristics of having (1) a public 
purpose, (2) a specific target, (3) a defined scope of information to be disclosed, (4) an articulated 
structure for information collection and communication, (5) an intended audience for the information, 
and (6) a system for enforcement (Graham & Miller, 2001).  
Fung et al. (2007) describe a transparency policy as sharing the characteristics of (1) requiring public 
disclosure of (2) standardized and comparable information (3) for a specific practice (4) with a defined 
purpose.  
The Institute for Market Transformation’s BuildRating.org website classifies policy components into the 
categories of (1) compliance details, (2) deadlines, (3) disclosure details, (4) reporting details, (5) 
outreach, training, and support, and (6) utility-requirements (Institute for Market Transformation, n.d.). 
Table 5. Categorized Policy Characteristics and Components Identified by Academic and Gray Literature 
Graham & Miller (2001) Fung et al. (2007) Institute for Market 
Transformation (n.d.) 
Public Purpose Defined Public Purpose n/a 
Specific Target Specific Practice n/a 
Defined Scope of Information Standardized Information Compliance Details 
Structure for Information 
Collection and 
Communication 
Comparable Information Reporting Details 
Intended Audience for 
Information 
Required Public Disclosure Disclosure Details 
System for Enforcement n/a Deadlines 
n/a n/a Utility Requirements 
n/a n/a Outreach, Training and 
Support 
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Table 6 builds upon the policy components listed above and presents the policy components which will 
be used in this thesis. The policy component names have been chosen to reflect the language used by 
active jurisdictions, and additional components—such as adoption process—have been added which are 
not captured in the list above but are employed by municipalities.  
Table 6. Policy Components used in this Thesis 
Policy Component Description 
Stated Policy Objectives Stated policy objectives describes the substantive and democratic 
reasons that a jurisdiction looks to benchmarking policies, including 
specific targets such as a decrease in GHG emissions and an increase 
in transparency.  
Adoption Process Adoption process describes the approach used to engage stakeholders 
in the selection of policy components. 
Coverage & Implementation Schedule Coverage describes the size and type of building required to disclose 
data. Implementation schedule describes the phased-in approach 
used by jurisdictions when launching a benchmarking policy.  
Disclosure Requirements Disclosure requirements describe the frequency and method of data 
sharing that is required.  
Audience Audience describes the intended information consumer, the medium 
of disclosure, and the technologies used to increase the utility of the 
data. 
Data Submission Data submission describes the method and requirements for buildings 
to provide benchmarking information to the city.  
Compliance Compliance describes the approach taken by cities to ensure that 
buildings adhere to the requirements of the benchmarking policy, and 
the training activities offered by a municipality to aid building owners 
in complying with benchmarking requirements. 
Adaptation Adaptation describes how policy makers use benchmarking as 
guidance and justification for further regulation, or expand existing 
benchmarking regulations to increase impact. 
These policy components will be used throughout the thesis to achieve the research objectives by 
allowing for categorization and cross comparison of theory and active policies.  
2.5 - Research Method 
The approach undertaken for the research in this thesis can be broken into three categories: (1) 
literature review, (2) document analysis, and (3) comparative analysis both across policies and between 
theory and practice. As the design of enquiry employed by this thesis is the case study, this three step 
approach permits contextualization, construction, and analysis of the case studies (Creswell, 2013). 
First, the literature review in Chapter 3 presents theoretical expectations of a benchmarking policy. A 
theoretical expectation is defined as a description made by the literature of how an effective 
benchmarking policy (or targeted disclosure policy more generally) should be structured. For example, 
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researchers looking at other disclosure regimes have found that, for consumers to find value in the new 
information, it must be presented in a clear, reliable, and readily accessible fashion that conforms to 
existing decision-making processes. The literature review was scoped to include English language articles 
on qualitative governance and design elements of transparency policies, with a focus on active policies 
targeting environmental and non-financial services impact areas within the United States. The impact 
area focus was selected to increase alignment with the intended goals and audience of energy 
benchmarking. The policy components were used to categorize the literature and direct the enquiry. For 
example, the literature does not explore data submission requirements in depth, and a targeted search 
was required to build out the theoretical expectation for this policy component.   
Second, case studies were created for the sample of jurisdictions with an active benchmarking policy 
and presented in Chapter 5. The following steps were taken to create the case studies: 
 Compile Data Sources: The data sources for each jurisdiction (identified in 2.2 – Data 
Availability and Limitations) were located through: (1) the benchmarking policy, environment, 
or energy section of a jurisdiction’s website; (2) the Institute of Market Transformation’s 
BuildingRating.org website which lists many of the documents; (3) Google searches using the 
name of the jurisdiction or policy, and complimentary terms such as “ordinance” and “annual 
report.” For each jurisdiction, this method produced positive results and all desired documents 
were located. As a result, instances where information on a policy component was not found 
for a given city are believed to be the result of a lack of disclosure on the part of the jurisdiction. 
For example, stakeholder engagement documents, the enacting ordinance, and annual reports 
were found for the city of Chicago but no information was included on the cost to the city of 
running the benchmarking policy. Seattle included cost information as an appendix to its 
enacting ordinance. It is assumed that Chicago does not readily disclose this information.  
 Organized Data by Policy Component: The documents were reviewed in full by the researcher 
and information was categorized by policy component. Sub-components, or variables, were 
then derived from the data. In the case of compliance, this included the sub-components of 
“one-time charge”, “increasing charge”, “building engagement & support”, and “data 
verification.” These sub-components represented the four design decisions that policy makers 
recorded in the enacting documents. This approach allowed for direct comparison between 
cities, and for alignment with the literature review.  
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 Trends in Active Jurisdictions: Sub-components were recorded as a simple “Yes” or No” for 
each jurisdiction. “Yes” was recorded in situations where an explicit acknowledgement was 
found in the primary documents of a jurisdiction. For example, Seattle’s enacting documents do 
not mention a desire to reduce GHG emissions through the benchmarking policy, and so “No” 
was recorded. This approach is justifiable because implicit policy design decisions likely carry 
less weight than those captured in the enacting documents. Table 7 provides an example of this 
process in action, with each jurisdiction receiving either a “Yes” or a “No” before an overall 
trend is identified. The term ‘trend’ is not intended to suggest a best practice or 
recommendation, but rather a trend is defined as an action taken by a simple majority of 
jurisdictions. The small sample size and generalization into trends are design limitations of this 
study. However, it is an important step because the trends are used to codify how active 
jurisdictions structure benchmarking policies which then allows for comparison against the 
theoretical expectations.   
Table 7. Demonstration of Approach for Identifying Trends 
Third, the analysis in Chapter 6 compares the theoretical expectations against the observed trends. This 
comparison is indirect as trends are described using a simple “Yes” or “No” statement, whereas theory is 
necessarily described in more general statements due to the fact that theory does not directly address 
energy benchmarking policy components. A table is presented with the trends for each policy 
component alongside the corresponding theoretical expectation. This table allows for the identification 
of gaps between what is observed in practice, and what is predicted by theory. This step addresses the 
primary objective of the thesis by assessing the suitability of current information disclosure theory at 
explaining the selection of policy components for municipal-level energy benchmarking policies in the 
U.S.  
The secondary objective is then considered by employing the research results as a lens by which to 
comment on key debates in the literature, and to advance an understanding of new governance and 
information disclosure theories. Findings from the literature review and case studies are used to 
accomplish this reconciliation. 
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Chapter 3 - Theoretical Framework for Mandatory Energy Benchmarking within 
Commercial Real-Estate 
3.1- Chapter Overview 
The chapter begins with an exploration of new governance and targeted information disclosure as the 
theoretical base for this thesis. The remainder of the chapter presents theoretical expectations for 
energy benchmarking policy design. The purpose of this chapter is to address the first question of this 
thesis: “Which policy components does theory suggest that jurisdictions should select?”  
3.2 - New Governance  
Shifting ideologies and fiscal reforms launched fresh conversations in the 1980s on the ways of 
governing, with the introduction of terms such as "new public management", "entrepreneurial 
government", and the "3Es", which suggested the adoption of novel approaches to regulation. One such 
term is "new governance", which sought to describe an alternative process or approach for ordering 
society in which non-state actors adopted some or all of the decision-making authority of government 
on a particular issue (Rhodes, 1996; Crowley & Coffey, 2007). According to Crowley & Coffey (2007) “if 
government is essentially about the process of acting with total authority and legitimacy, then 
governance has become about extending this process beyond the state, raising the question of the 
extent to which authority and legitimacy can be assumed beyond government” (p. 24). 
Within new governance literature there exist two viewpoints that describe the role of government—and 
the “extent to which authority and legitimacy can be assumed beyond government”—within this new 
paradigm in opposing ways (Crowley & Coffey, 2007, p. 24). Pierre & Peters “define governance as 
covering the whole range of institutions and relations involved in the process of governing, with its 
appeal being in making political science more policy relevant and in raising the issue of how to pursue 
collective goals” (Crowley & Coffey, 2007, p. 24-25). For Pierre & Peters, government retains an 
important role in governance because of its hierarchical position and control of critical resources (Pierre 
& Peters, 2000). Alternatively, Rhodes (1997) sees governance as offering an opportunity for increasing 
societal control through the use of networks that are capable of forming their own policies and 
identities outside of government and market control. Rhodes succinctly describes governance as 
“governing without government” (pp. 667), and representing a “hollowing out of the state” (pp. 660). 
Lundqvist (2001) attempts to find a middle ground between Rhodes’s view that governance represents a 
"hollowing out of the state", and Pierre and Peters' view that governments steer governance. The case 
of Sweden's Local Investment Programs for Sustainable Development (LIPSD) is used to test the 
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propositions of Rhodes and Pierre & Peters. Lundqvist (2001) sides with Pierre & Peters to an extent, 
finding that the Swedish government "created new structures and processes of governance to keep its 
initiative over constitutionally independent expert agencies and municipal governments--exactly those 
actors that, in Rhode's view, could make central governmental steering well nigh impossible" (p. 1). 
However, Lundqvist also recognizes a degree of “governing without government” because, although the 
Swedish government was able to assert direct control over the process and structures of governance, it 
was unable to control the end results. Lundqvist suggests that analysis of new governance must give 
"attention to the critical interplay between structure, process, and end results, and to government's role 
in governance" (p. 1).  
Cashore (2002) finds alignment with Pierre & Peters by presenting governance as "the increasing use of 
procedures in which state policy-making authority is shared with (or given to) business, environmental, 
and other interests; and the increasing use of market-oriented policy instruments with which to address 
matters of concern to global civil society" (p. 503) At the same time though, Cashore divides governance 
into government-driven governance and non-state-market-driven governance. The latter enforces 
compliance within a supply chain through market incentives and disclosure to key supplier, regulator, 
and customer audiences. Cashore provides as an example of non-state-market-driven governance the 
Forest Stewardship Council’s certification program.  
Fung, Graham & Weil (2007) assert that government action is required for governance by transparency 
for three reasons. “First, only government can compel the disclosure of information from private and 
public entities. Second, only government can legislate permanence in transparency. Third, only 
government can create transparency backed by the legitimacy of democratic process” (Fung et al., 2007, 
p. 6). 
Energy benchmarking policies resemble the governance structure Lundqvist (2001) found in Sweden’s 
LIPSD so far as the framework is created and enforced by government, but there exists a degree of 
governing without government because—as will be explained later in this chapter—much of the desired 
impact is generated by market forces. Under Cashore’s (2002) classification system, benchmarking 
would be an example of government-driven governance. In addition to the core elements of 
benchmarking, an important strength is that they can lead to further government regulations and 
incentives based upon the information generated by disclosure. In this way, benchmarking can be a 
precursor and enabling force for traditional command-and-control regulations. This will be explored in 
greater depth in 3.11 – Adaptation and 5.9 – Adaptation.  
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Central to the argument for new governance as a policy tool is an increase in accountability (Norris, 
2014; Estlund, 2011). Bovens (2007) defines accountability as “a relationship between an actor and a 
forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can 
pose questions and pass judgment, and the actor may face consequences” (p. 452). Accountability has 
been described as being the third wave of environmental regulation – following the original command 
and control approach and the subsequent introduction of market-based incentives such as emission fees 
and marketable permits (Cohen & Santhakumar, 2007). 
Norris (2014) categorizes accountability as involving one of three power flows:  
 Top-down: Traditional power flow in which a senior actor instructs a junior actor. An example is 
an employer requiring a performance review of an employee. 
 Horizontal: Occurs when an actor incentivizes an actor of equivalent power or influence. An 
example is when a government agency presses another “to actively participate in deliberation 
and problem-solving…” (Norris, 2014, p. 206). 
 Bottom-up: Occurs when a junior actor influences a senior actor. An example is an employee 
pressing their employer for increased environmental performance. 
Energy benchmarking policies involve all three categories of accountability power flow. Top-down as 
government is requiring the disclosure of energy data, horizontal in that a major prospective tenant can 
demand action by a building owner, and bottom-up as civil society can advocate for change. That said, 
the time, format, and accessibility of disclosure of benchmarking data will enhance or limit the strength 
of accountability power flow.  
Norris continues that accountability can be further examined to determine if it is principal-agent or 
reflexive accountability: 
 Principal-agent accountability “occurs when one actor (the principal) pressures or coerces 
another actor (the agent) into doing the principal's will” (Norris, 2014, p. 206). An example is an 
employer instructing an employee to complete an action.  
 Reflexive accountability occurs when an actor changes behavior in response to the release of 
information. It is termed reflexive because “it involves continual reflection on the significance of 
information coming from various sources” (Norris, 2014, p. 207). An example is the use of 
financial statements to modify the operations of an organization to lower expenses.  
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“Reflexive and principal–agent accountabilities are not mutually exclusive, because pressure or coercion 
(principal–agent accountability) may lead actors to change in response to information (reflexive 
accountability)” (Norris, 2014, p. 207). Energy benchmarking policies represent both principal-agent 
accountability and reflexive accountability. Principal-agent because government is mandating the act of 
disclosure and in some cases require additional actions—such as retrofits—and reflexive because intra-
organizational and public accountability is created through the act of regular and public reporting 
(Norris, 2014). Principal-agent accountability can also act as a barrier to the implementation of energy 
efficiency. As will be explained later in this chapter, if a landlord (agent) controls the infrastructure of a 
building and the tenant (principal) is required to pay the utilities bill, this can create a split-incentive 
where the tenant is unable to upgrade the building infrastructure which leads to high utility bills, and 
the landlord has little incentive to pay for the upgrades because the energy savings will be realized by 
the tenant. New governance offers the promise of correcting for this barrier by changing the normative 
and real estate market context through the provision of new information.   
In all forms of accountability, a key consideration is: who is accountable to whom? Who has a voice, 
and—importantly—who does not have a voice? Reporting requirements are often crafted, and 
subsequent evaluations often conducted, by select consulting firms and experts. Participation within 
reporting schemes is sometimes extended to important industry associations (ex. Building Owners and 
Managers Association) or well-known NGOs (ex. Environmental Defense Fund) to act as watchdogs and 
to represent the voice of voiceless beneficiaries (ex. global climate, economically disadvantaged 
communities). At best, this creates a layer between those impacted and the new governance system, 
which “raises profound questions of legitimacy and accountability” (Conley & Williams, 2011, p. 568). If 
the watchdogs are selected for their complicity, there is a danger that they will not properly advocate 
for the beneficiaries.  
Critics of new governance “question the processes—or lack thereof—for selecting those who will share 
this diffused power and ask how these people and institutions will be held accountable” (Conley & 
Williams, 2011, p. 554).  Shever (2010), for example, has examined the efforts of a multinational oil 
company to practice corporate social responsibility in Argentina. She concludes that it has been nothing 
more than a charade that “shifts the terrain of struggle away from the formal judicial domain . . . to the 
more pliable field of public opinion” (p. 41). In other words, it has been a shift from established 
democratic processes to corporate and technocratic shadows.  
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Shamir (2008) argues that this shift results in a marketization of authority wherein government, 
corporate, and civil society actors operate on par, and “a variety of ‘guidelines’, ‘codes of conducts’, 
‘principles’ and ‘standards’” replace coercive laws or regulations (p. 7). The broader concern, captured 
by Malsch (2013), is that a reliance on “the amoral and disembodied authority of market mechanisms 
[and] a technical arsenal of calculations and rankings” redirects the debate from an absolute morality 
described “in terms of the common social or political good [to] a defensive perspective based on the 
identified reputational risks and their impact on business” (p. 156). The implication is that new 
governance detracts from the ideal of an inclusive, accountable, and moral democracy.  
Fung and Wright (2003) defend new governance against criticisms that it will result in bureaucrats and 
non-state actors assuming legislative roles. They argue that new governance is determined to assume 
the decision-making role previously held by isolated departments and agencies within government, and 
in doing so, new governance offers the possibility of restoring democracy to bureaucracy. Sabel (2008) 
and Zeitlin (2008) continue the argument, stating that the accountability driven by new governance can 
lead to both state and non-state actors employing newly available data generated by new governance to 
press for better policies.  
Energy benchmarking policies in the U.S. are too new to yet assess whether they represent a shift of 
responsibility to corporations and technocrats, or if instead it restores democracy to bureaucracy. On 
the one hand, the design of benchmarking policies met resistance from powerful lobbying groups which 
shaped the end result (described in 5.3 – Adoption Process). On the other hand, previously inaccessible 
and arcane datasets have been released to the public, providing new avenues for advocates to engage 
with building owners and push for improved policies (described in 5.6 – Audience).  
3.3 –Targeted Information Disclosure  
“We call for a new understanding of the democratic mantra of ‘access to information’ so that it means 
more than simply placing data in the public domain. Instead, it means requiring the provision of content 
that is useful, customized, and interactive.” 
-Fung et al., 2007, p. 181. 
Fung et al. (2007) describe three generations of disclosure policies beginning with right-to-know policies 
that sought to make government more transparent through measures like the U.S. Freedom of 
Information Action (1966), which captured a belief that the public has a right to government 
information.  A second generation of targeted transparency policies defined access to specific 
information “with the aim of furthering particular policy objectives” (Fung et al., 2007, p. 25). A third 
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generation has begun to build upon targeted transparency by leveraging the power of the internet to 
create user-centred programs that draw out the information of private actors into an accessible system 
facilitated by government. Gupta (2010) titles targeted transparency policies as “governance by 
disclosure [whereby] the very act of disclosing information is central to achieving various aims” (p. 2). 
When effective, these policies drive a specific policy outcome by incorporating information into the 
decision-making process of both the targeted company and consumers (Fung et al., 2007).   
Estlund (2010) describes targeted transparency policies as “regulated self-regulation” (p. 404). While the 
language is different, Estlund’s description is similar to Norris’ (2004) principle-agent and reflexive 
accountabilities, and Lundqvist‘s (2001) governing without government within government-created 
processes, in that it recognizes the dual nature of targeted transparency policies as both a government 
imposition and a market force.  
Mitchell (2011) presents education-by-transparency policies as an additional form of transparency 
wherein “the same actor is both targeted actor and information recipient” (p. 1885). Whereas under 
targeted transparency policy regimes an information producer (ex. company) is required to disclose 
specific information to an information consumer (ex. the public), education-by-transparency is designed 
to provide new or contextualized information to the information producer to inspire behaviour change.  
Education-by-transparency is similar to Norris’ (2004) reflexive accountability as both require the 
discloser to reflect on opportunities with a shifting environment for improved performance. Energy 
benchmarking policies are both targeted in that they seek to reduce information asymmetries, and 
educational in that they provide building owners with new and contextualized information to support 
the decision-making process of building owners. This thesis will use the term “targeted transparency” 
generally to include education-by-transparency, while continuing to distinguish energy benchmarking 
from earlier forms of disclosure and in recognition of the specific aims of the policy tool.  
While there are many different formulations of transparency policies (see Table 8 for several examples), 
Fung et al. (2003) argue that transparency policies form a “cohesive policy innovation” (p. 5). By design, 
a targeted transparency policy will have a clearly defined purpose and associated metric which it seeks 
to influence by disclosing information from a specific source to an intended audience through an 
articulated system, and with a predicable method of enforcement (Graham & Miller, 2001). 
Table 8. U.S.-based targeted transparency policies 
Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (1959) 
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Unions are required to reveal financial information (ex. revenues, expenditures) and governance 
practices (constitution, governance changes) annually. The intended goal was to reduce union 
corruption (Fung et al., 2007). 
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (1975) 
Requires banks and other lending institutions to disclose “the amounts and geographical 
distribution of their loan applications, origins, and purchases disaggregated by race, gender, annual 
income, and other characteristics” (Fung et al., 2007, p. 203). This law was created to limit racialized 
lending practices. 
Toxic Release Inventory (1986) 
Disclosure of chemical releases that fall under a schedule of nearly 700 toxic chemicals. (Cohen & 
Santhakumar, 2007; Fung & O'Rourke, 2000). Covered toxic emissions decreased by 48 percent 
between 1988 and 2000 (De Marchi & Hamilton, 2006) 
Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (1988) 
Organizations with 100 or more employees are required to “provide workers, the state government 
dislocated worker unit, and local government officials with written notice 60 days before a planned 
shutdown or large-scale layoff” (Ehrenberg & Jakubson, 1990, p. 39).  
The Nutrition Labeling and Education Act (1990) 
Food producers are required to label amounts of key nutrients to counteract heart disease, cancer, 
and diabetes which lead to the deaths of 1.5 million Americans each year. These deaths have been 
found to be preventable by improved diet (Fung et al., 2007). 
Los Angeles Restaurant Hygiene Disclosure Program (1997) 
Requires restaurants to post a card with results from a public health inspection (Weil, Fung, 
Graham, & Fagotto, 2006). Food-related hospitalizations decreased by as much as 20% (Jin & Leslie, 
2003). 
Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation Act (2000) 
Required automotive manufacturers to disclose facts about the rollover risks of each model, with 
the aim of improving safety of “top-heavy SUVs” (Fung et al., 2007, p. 195). 
An example of a third generation targeted transparency policy is the Los Angeles Restaurant Hygiene 
Disclosure Program (established in 1997), which requires restaurants to post a simple quality card with 
results from a public health inspection (Weil et al., 2006). This program is successful because it clearly 
provides information at the point of decision for a consumer with little time cost to obtain and process 
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the information. The program provides clear signals and alternative actions for the owners of the 
restaurants: address the items they received a failing grade for, and they will receive a passing grade for 
their hygiene card. A detailed study found that the Hygiene Disclosure Program could be responsible for 
a reduction in food-related hospitalizations by as much as 20%, and an increase in revenue for 
restaurants with strong health performance (Jin & Leslie, 2003).  
A second example of a targeted transparency policy—and one of the most widely studied—is the Toxic 
Release Inventory (TRI) which was created by the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to Know 
Act (1986) following the Union Carbide Bhopal disaster in India that killed "at least 3,800 people and 
[caused] significant morbidity and premature death for many thousands more" (Broughton, 2005, p. 1). 
Under TRI, firms are required to disclose the release of toxins that fall under a schedule of nearly 700 
chemicals (Cohen & Santhakumar, 2007; Fung & O'Rourke, 2000).  The program was so successful that 
between 1988 and 2000 that emissions were decreased by 48 percent (De Marchi & Hamilton, 2006). 
Fung & O’Rourke (2000) state that “reductions of releases of chemicals on the TRI list sparkle in 
comparison to the lackluster performance of other EPA programs” (p. 116). See Table 99 for statements 
from a variety of voices on the impact of TRI.  
Table 9. Statements about impact of TRI 
“[TRI’s] mandatory disclosure has done more than all other legislation put together in getting 
companies to voluntarily reduce emissions” (Seabrook, 1991, sec. G, p. 1.). 
 
Millar Etling, Environmental Manager, Dow Chemical 
‘‘Putting information about local pollution into the hands of the public is the single most effective, 
common sense tool available for protecting human health and the environment” (Mansur & Reeves, 
1996, sec. A1).  
 
Al Gore, Vice President, United States 
“[We] knew the numbers were high, and we knew the public wasn’t going to like it” (Fung & 
O’Rourke, 2000). Statement made prior to release of TRI data. Monsanto pledged to cut TRI chemicals 
by 90% in 3 years.  
Not Attributed, Vice Chairman, Monsanto 
Targeted transparency policies are purported to work by impacting the decision-making process of a key 
stakeholder (ex. consumer) and the discloser (ex. manufacturer), and providing new engagement 
opportunities for the public and policy-makers. Blok, de Groot, Luiten & Rietbergen (2004) lists the 
following three ways in which targeted transparency policies influence behaviour change in a firm: 
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 Communication: Successful policies educate targeted firms on opportunities for achieving the 
desired change and the supporting business case. Energy benchmarking policies typically reach 
out directly to building owners and managers with educational materials and in some cases 
require a building owner to acknowledge the energy performance of their building by signing a 
form submitted alongside the data. 
 Economic incentives: Publicly traded firms which performed poorly under TRI suffered a loss in 
stock price which “translated into an average loss of $4.1 million in stock value for TRI firms on 
the day the pollution figures were first released” (Hamilton, 1995, pg. 98). Konar and Chohen 
(1997) found that firms which pollute the most experienced the greatest declines, but that these 
high polluters subsequently “became relatively lower TRI emitters following the public 
announcement of TRI data, both in absolute and relative terms within their industries” (Fung & 
O’Rourke, 2000, p. 19). These financial impacts extend beyond TRI. Numerous studies that 
analyze the commercial building sector (Christmas 2011, Campbell 2011, Miller et al 2008, 
Jackson 2009, Das et al 2011) “show higher occupancy rates, higher rents, and higher property 
values for high-efficiency buildings” (Cox et al., 2013, p. 4). While these studies do not look at 
the financial impacts within markets with benchmarking policies specifically, Kontokosta (2013) 
states that demand-side market mechanisms and regulations which are “designed to require 
better relative energy performance will increase risk exposure for less efficient buildings, thus 
prompting owners and developers (producers) to supply more efficient space” (Kontokosta, 
2013, p. 35). 
 Normative incentives: Disclosure policies should attempt to change the social context in which a 
decision is made. Press and civil society organizations are important agents in this process by 
using the data to pressure the worst performers (Fung & O'Rourke, 2000). Current 
benchmarking policies, as will be shown in the following chapter, take very different approaches 
to how data is disclosed which in turn changes how the press and civil society organizations can 
access the data and subsequently impact normative values.  
While Blok et al. (2004) describe the ways in which a targeted transparency policy must influence 
behaviour change in firms specifically, Weil et al. (2013) expand the analysis to describe a relationship 
where behaviour change in consumers motivates action by firms. Weil et al. describe this relationship as 
an “action cycle” of “information provision, use and response” (p. 1410). When effective, consumers 
integrate new information provided by a targeted transparency policy into existing decision processes 
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and shift consumption patterns in alignment with the desired outcome of the policymaker (Markard & 
Holt, 2003; Moskovitz, Cowart, Levy, & Roe, 1998). Depending on the information revealed, a 
“consumer may decide to reduce or withdraw from consuming the product of a firm that is a higher 
polluter. Investors may shun the stock of firms that are found to be high polluters—either through 
socially active investment decisions or by an assessment that highly polluting firms will ultimately be less 
profitable” (Cohen & Santhakumar, 2007, p. 600). For this shift in consumer purchasing to fully meet the 
policy outcomes desired by policymakers, “target companies must perceive and act on consumers' 
responses in ways that reduce risks, improve services, minimize corruption, or otherwise further a policy 
goal” (Weil, Graham, & Fung, 2013, p. 1410). 
Finally, targeted transparency may also have a policy impact. The real or implied threat of additional 
policy measures may also incentivize firms to voluntarily improve their performance and related 
disclosed metrics (Fung, Graham, & Weil, Full Disclosure: The Perils and Promise of Transparency, 2007). 
Targeted disclosure policies are not without detractors. The critiques range from questions about the 
quality of the data being reported and the lack of sustained reductions for TRI (Natan & Miller, 1998), to 
more troubling accusations of misplaced incentives resulting in a system which produces negative 
results. The example of hospital and physician reports cards is a useful demonstration of the challenges 
associated with disclosure. While proponents argue that report cards help “patients to identify the best 
physicians and hospitals, while simultaneously giving providers powerful incentives to improve quality,” 
critics respond that they are likely to “encourage providers to ‘game’ the system by avoiding sick 
patients or seeking healthy patients or both” (Dranove et al., 2003, p. 556).  If a hospital is penalized for 
high patient mortality, it may be incentivized to reject the most ill patients, opting instead to maximize 
its score by treating only cases where the result is relatively assured. The complexity of medical care 
makes it extremely difficult to create a reporting system that does not create false incentives (Dranove 
et al., 2003). 
3.4 – Stated Policy Objectives 
The foundational policy objective for implementing an energy disclosure policy—although certainly not 
the only one—is what Jaffe and Stavins (1994) call the “energy efficiency gap,” a term which describes 
the economic and social barriers preventing the attainment of technologically feasible efficiency. They 
describe the energy efficiency gap as the “paradox of gradual diffusion of apparently cost-effective 
energy efficient technologies” (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994, p.91). Sorrell et al. (2000) similarly describes 
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these barriers to energy efficiency as “mechanisms that inhibit investment in technologies that are both 
energy efficient and economically efficient” (Sorrell et al., 2000, p. 27).  
Cox et al., through interviews with active benchmarking jurisdictions, found that all benchmarking policy 
managers believed that “a large information gap related to building energy consumption existed in their 
jurisdiction prior to the benchmarking and mandated disclosure laws” (Cox, Brown, & Sun, 2013, p. 3). 
According to Cox et al., this energy efficiency gap is the result of three main information failures: 
1. Information asymmetry: When one actor has more information than another actor—possibly 
resulting from a hierarchical power dynamic—“suboptimal energy efficiency decisions” may be 
produced (Chai & Yeo, 2012, p. 461). In the case of commercial buildings, owners and managers 
often have greater access to a building’s energy efficiency performance data than would a 
prospective tenant, buyer, or financier (Cox, 2013). This asymmetry may cause consumers to 
“lack adequate baseline information about quality characteristics and variation to compare 
products and practices” (Weil et al., 2013, p. 1410). This problem extends to the public sphere, 
where service providers and public agencies lack information on buildings. The management 
adage of ‘you cannot manage what you do not measure’ can similarly be applied in the policy 
context with ‘you cannot effectively regulate what you do not understand.’ Energy disclosure 
policies are an important tool for policy-makers because buildings are complex and often 
opaque to external eyes, which make it exceedingly difficult to craft effective policies to drive 
energy efficiency. Instead, correcting for information asymmetries through the use of energy 
benchmarking sets normative constraints which align with the overarching policy goal of 
increased energy efficiency (Kontokosta, 2013).  
2. Principal-agent problems: Principal-agent problems “occur when one party (the agent) makes 
decisions in a market [and] a different party (the principal) bears the consequences” (Cox, 
Brown, & Sun, 2013, p. 2). An example within the commercial building market is the “split 
incentive” problem wherein the building owner (agent) invests in the up-front costs of an energy 
efficiency upgrade, but the tenant (principal) enjoys the energy cost savings. In this scenario, 
energy efficiency investments may be limited by “an inequitable distribution of costs and 
benefits and a subsequent undervaluation of potential savings” (Kontokosta, 2013, p. 35). 
Prindle (2007) found that principal-agent problems also exist within the construction phase, 
where architects, engineers, and contractors make design decisions (agent) which will either 
benefit or hinder future owners and tenants (principle). New tools, such as “green leases” are 
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beginning to emerge in which the benefits and costs of energy efficiency upgrades are shared by 
the principle and agent, and energy benchmarking is seen as a mechanism for incentivizing and 
monitoring green leases (Kontokosta, 2013). 
3. Artificially high discount rate: As a result of technological risk aversion and knowledge gaps, 
owner and managers have been found to apply discount rates to energy efficiency technologies 
that are “far higher than theoretically anticipated, resulting in few purchase of high-efficiency 
equipment” (Cox, Brown, & Sun, 2013, p. 2). This is caused in part because “knowledge gaps add 
to the cost of capital and limit the efficient pricing of energy investments in the market” 
(Kontokosta, 2013, p. 35). 
As a policy tool, benchmarking is therefore regarded favourably because “greater information on energy 
performance would allow tenants to incorporate energy metrics into leasing decisions” which “in turn, 
should create demand for more efficient buildings, thereby increasing asset value and encouraging 
building owners to improve the relative energy efficiency of their buildings to make them more 
competition” (Kontokosta, 2013, p. 35). In other words, by adding new information to the marketplace, 
energy benchmarking is believed to close the energy efficiency gap by correcting for the three 
aforementioned information failures.  
Additionally, jurisdictions are motivated to adopt energy benchmarking policies because they are often 
seen as the low-cost option to pressure firms to reduce negative environmental impacts by equipping 
“consumers, investors, and regulators with the proper tools to assess corporate strategies and liabilities, 
thereby giving companies an economic incentive to reduce emissions” (Zhu & Zhang, 2012, p. 705). The 
prevailing narrative is that information disclosure programs cost “government far less than drafting and 
implementing industry wide regulations” (Cohen & Santhakumar, 2007, p. 600). Fung & O’Rourke 
(2000), identify the cost of TRI to the EPA as approximately $23 million/annum. Beyond this statement, 
no specific discussion was found on the cost of disclosure programs to government, the cost to the 
market, consideration of the cost-benefit ratio, or the cost savings relative to command-and-control 
regulations. Cohen & Santhakumar propose a list of costs that should be identified and compared 
against the environmental benefits of a given disclosure policy. The costs include: 
 Government control: Costs include policy making, data collection and verification, and data 
dissemination and program communications. For energy benchmarking, costs occur federally for 
the design and delivery of EPA's ENERGY STAR, and municipally for the implementation of the 
policy. 
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 Business reporting: Costs include collecting and reporting data, communicating results to 
stakeholders, and taking voluntary action to reduce pollution. For commercial buildings this cost 
will be centered in labour costs and efficiency upgrades. While larger organizations, such as a 
property manager like Bentall Kennedy, may have a dedicated sustainability or energy 
management staff person, smaller operations will need to add these tasks to an employee with 
an un-related job profile. 
 Civil society engagement: Civil society organizations are required to analyze data, develop 
strategies, communicate with their public, and pressure corporate and state actors for change 
through lobbying and litigation. All of these steps have costs, primarily staffing. Government 
may wish to consider subsidies through grants for some aspects of civil society engagement as it 
represents a substitution for government evaluation and enforcement.  
 Opportunity Cost: There is a limit to the number of policies that a government can impose on an 
industry to address an environmental metric. By choosing to implement a targeted transparency 
policy, the jurisdiction may be foregoing the use of other policy tools. In the case of 
benchmarking, this could mean foregoing an increase in the building code. This cost is amplified 
if the benchmarking policy is unsuccessful in creating the desired change (Cohen & 
Santhakumar, 2007) 
Finally, jurisdictions may find benchmarking attractive if more traditional command-and-control policies 
are deemed too politically contested. It is likely easier politically to require disclosure of information, for 
example, than it is to require an energy efficiency upgrade. Weil et al. contend that governments look to 
targeted transparency tools such as benchmarking “when rules, taxes, or subsidies prove impractical as 
policy tools” (Weil et al., 2013, p. 1410). These policies are also seen as satisfying “the democratic belief 
that the public has a ‘right to know’ that they might be affected by third party pollution” (Cohen & 
Santhakumar, 2007, p. 600). However, Gupta argues that it is “important to ask whether transparency is 
simply a default option when more transformative governance pathways are precluded” (Gupta, 2010, 
p. 7). Once again circling back to the separate but connected arguments of Norris (2014) and Lundqvist 
(2001) that transparency policies have a dual nature as both a government imposition and a market 
force, it is important to acknowledge that “one cannot have a meaningful right to information unless 
someone else has a corresponding duty to provide that information” (Caldart, 1985, p. 384). For 
disclosure to be effective, government rule-setting and enforcement is still required “in those cases 
where [a building owner or manager] fails to comply with a duty to generate, retain, or disclose 
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information, or seeks to limit the scope of that duty, it is the availability, timeliness, and strength of the 
relevant legal enforcement mechanism that will ultimately determine whether or not the duty is fully 
performed” (Caldart, 1985, p. 387). While depth of disclosure and enforcement will be explored further 
later in the chapter, jurisdictions must be motivated by more than simple political expediency in the 
selection of disclosure as the preferred policy option.  
In summation, it can be expected that jurisdictions seeking to implement an effective benchmarking 
policy will be motivated by a need to close the energy efficiency gap and:  
1. To create a more efficient market by providing information to key stakeholders including 
prospective tenants, buyers, and financiers 
2. An inability of command-and-control policies to capture the complexity of buildings, and the 
need for policy-makers to have additional information 
3. To correct for principal-agent problem by providing the information to encourage mutually 
beneficial solutions 
4. The low-cost of a benchmarking policy relative to traditional command-and-control policies 
5. To reduce information failures, and to allow for the proper pricing and discount rate to increase 
adoption of efficient technologies 
6. Improve a specific and measurable environmental metric 
7. Need for policy-makers to have additional information to craft more effective regulations 
3.5 – Adoption Process 
Energy benchmarking policies interact with, depend upon, and influence a wide array of stakeholders 
(see Figure 1) by shifting the flows of information. Building owners obtain data from managers, utilities, 
and sub-metered tenants. This data is transformed by NGOs and government to improve policies and to 
communicate back to the data providers as well as the public at large.  
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Figure 1. Benchmarking information flows 
 
(Kontokosta, 2013) 
The inclusion of such a wide array of voices is challenging. As Fung, Graham & Wright (2002) explain, 
“because many transparency policies impose concentrated costs on a limited number of disclosers for 
the sake of dispersed beneficiaries, the deck is stacked against them” (p. 36-37). Fung et al. (2003) tell of 
the impact of political influence during the creation of the Securities and Exchange Acts. Congress 
authorized the Securities and exchange Commission to enforce mandatory accounting standards, but 
business and investment bank lobbyists watered down the regulation to exclude “railroad stocks, 
intrastate issues, and all stocks already issues” (Fung, Weil, Graham, & Fagotto, 2003, p. 7). 
The Institute for Market Transformation (2011) suggests that benchmarking policies should require “the 
disclosure of benchmarking inputs, such as gross building area, operating hours, space type and other 
information [which] maximizes benchmarking transparency and thus discourage willful 
misrepresentations of inputs to achieve better benchmarking ratings” (p. 49). However, it notes that real 
30 
 
estate lobbyists have successfully kept this feature out of the benchmarking policies in most 
jurisdictions.  
The requirement of integrating users into policy design can be extended to include other stakeholders 
such as civil society and government—voices which can represent the dispersed beneficiaries. With this 
broad view, policy adoption “becomes a shared problem-solving process” (Lobel, 2004, p. 297), 
embodied by the concepts of “multi-party cooperation”, “constructive dialogue”, “multistakeholder 
consultation”, and “democratic participation” (Lobel, 2004, p. 362). However, if stakeholder 
engagement is merely a rubber stamping of a pre-determined approach, it legitimizes the transference 
of authority from the democratic state to the market while excluding those closest to the unresolved 
impact. Interestingly, little conversation exists within the literature about the approach for engaging 
stakeholders in policy design, despite the wide recognition of stakeholder influence (Fung et al., 2007). 
Fung et al. (2007) suggest that effective targeted transparency policies share the two major themes of 
user centricity and policy sustainability. User centricity describes the act of designing policies to satisfy 
the informational needs, management decision-making structures, and technical abilities of both 
information consumers and producers (Fung et al., 2007). Stakeholder engagement early in the process 
is important to ensure the proper inclusion of these design considerations.  
Policy sustainability describes the act of designing policies “that gain in use, accuracy, and scope over 
time” which is important “because markets and public priorities change, and because policy makers 
constantly need to fill loopholes discovered by reluctant information disclosers” (Fung et al., 2007, p. 
11). As transparency systems impose costs on the disclosing group for the benefit of a large and often 
unorganized group of information users, those disclosing have an upper hand and ample incentive to 
shape the transparency system over time to meet their interests. To remain relevant and impactful, 
Fung et al. (2007) identify three dimensions that are required for policy sustainability as “expanding 
scope of information relative to the scope of the problem addressed; increasing accuracy and quality of 
information; and increasing use of information by consumers, investors, employees, political activists, 
voters, residents, and/or government officials” (Fung et al., 2007, p. 109). In many ways, policy 
sustainability is simply an extension of user centrality. If the information becomes useful and important 
to an array of users, there will be greater incentives for the system to be not only maintained but 
continually improved.  
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Fung et al. (2007) discussed the implementation schedule for the U.S. Transportation Recall 
Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation (TREAD) Act, a policy that “required public disclosure 
of the rollover propensity of each new-model car and SUV as measured by government tests” (Fung et 
al., 2007, p. 195). Of the eight disclosure policy case studies that Fung et al. reviewed, TREAD was unique 
by including provisions that required the government to continuously improve the accuracy of the rating 
system. The result has been a policy that has continued to increase the rollover safety of vehicles. 
It can be expected that policy-makers designing the engagement process for an energy benchmarking 
policy will seek to: 
1. Engage a wide array of stakeholders in the design process 
2. Ensure that the information provided will be integrated into the existing decision processes of 
consumers 
3. Understand how disclosers will interpret and respond to behaviour change from consumers 
4. Use federally produced resources and civil society publicizing to reduce costs 
5. Consider the costs and benefits of the policy in the design documents so as to identify whether 
benchmarking is the right approach for meeting energy goals 
3.6 – Coverage & Implementation Schedule 
Although the TRI has been hailed for its effectiveness, Graham & Miller (2001) note that it covers only 
large businesses and a limited number of chemicals which allows some manufacturers to avoid reporting 
under the policy altogether or substituting chemicals. Similarly, critics of the Worker Adjustment and 
Retraining Notification Act note that it too is not universally applied as it only covers large businesses, 
and offers exemptions in cases where the business is seeking a buyer, if the causes of the shutdown are 
not reasonably foreseeable, in cases of natural disasters, or if the business moves within a “’reasonable’ 
commuting distance of its previous site and offers employees jobs at the new location” (Ehrenberg & 
Jakubson, 1990, p. 39).  
The stakeholder pressures discussed earlier in this chapter are certainly one explanation for the 
exemptions. However, an argument can also be made in favour of the exemptions because they target 
the firms which have the largest impact and, in doing so, limit the administrative costs of working with 
many small organizations (Kontokosta, 2013). 
The literature does not directly address how policies should structure coverage requirements, but 
extrapolations can be made based on existing programs. Fung et al. (2007) lists seven case studies of 
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U.S. transparency policies that target organizations. Table 10 lists the policies and identifies the 
restrictions put in place to scope the type (and ultimately the number) of organizations covered by the 
policy. The Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation Act (TREAD), and 
the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act both are broadly applied to their respective sectors. The remaining 
five case studies, however, are scoped to cover specific types of organizations. While Fung et al. (2007) 
describe unique political pressures that led to the scoping requirements of each policy, an alternate 
explanation—not found in the literature—could be that, relative to the number of firms that would be 
covered by the Securities and Exchange Act if it were applied broadly to also include all non-profit 
organizations and small businesses, the automotive and mortgage lending industries are smaller in size, 
and more homogeneous in capacity, structure, and financial might. Simply put, small and homogeneous 
populations may not require as many exemptions because fewer outliers exist, whereas large and 
heterogeneous populations may require exemptions to account for a diversity of situations.  
Table 10. U.S. Transparency Policies that Target Organizations 
Policy Covered Organizations 
Securities and Exchange Acts  Publicly traded firms 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration  Manufacturing firms 
Toxic Release Inventory  Manufacturing firms over threshold of emissions 
Nutrition Labeling and Education Act Food processors, exempting “fast-food outlets, 
full-service restaurants, fresh meats and seafood, 
deli items, and dietary supplements” (Fung, 
Graham, & Weil, Full Disclosure: The Perils and 
Promise of Transparency, 2007)  
Transportation Recall Enhancement, 
Accountability, and Documentation Act 
Manufacturers of cars and SUVs 
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Banks and other lending associations 
Work Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act Public firms. Private and non-profit organizations 
if they have over 100 employees 
Targeted transparency policies are often phased in over time. The segmentation of covered buildings by 
square footage and building type allows jurisdictions this option of phasing in coverage over time, rather 
than requiring all buildings to begin reporting at the same time. Kontokosta (2012b) identified a pattern 
within the implementation schedule of existing benchmarking policies to phase in coverage over several 
years—beginning with government buildings, then introducing buildings with high square footage, and 
33 
 
finally buildings with lower square footage. This approach is selected in order to allow the city to 
improve internal processes while responding to a smaller client-base, and for the consulting and 
engineering sector to build capacity as market demand increases. Phased-in implementation also allows 
government and large buildings, which often have established sustainability reporting policies already in 
place, to demonstrate early leadership and allay fears of those new to sustainability reporting.   
While the literature is limited in its discussion of the implementation of targeted transparency policies, 
taken together it can be expected that policy makers designing the implementation schedules for an 
energy benchmarking policy will seek to:  
1. Limit the type of buildings covered by the policy in heterogeneous markets and where there are 
a large number of actors 
2. Focus on large emitters to increase the impact relative to the administrative cost 
3.  Phase in coverage over several years in order to allow for institutional learning and program 
improvement, and to allow market of engineers and consultants to build capacity 
3.7 – Disclosure Requirements 
Disclosure policies can release information to the market either through triggered or scheduled 
disclosure. Under triggered disclosure, building owners are required to disclose information upon an 
event such as placing a building on the market for sale. Scheduled disclosure, which the vast majority of 
benchmarking policies use, normally requires annual disclosure of energy consumption data. Triggered 
disclosure is useful so far as it provides current information to prospective buyers and financiers, but it 
prevents standardized reporting, longitudinal comparisons and incentives for continual improvements. 
Triggered disclosure appears to be used as a compromise option to lessen the demand upon disclosers. 
In addition to infrequent reporting, triggered disclosure tends to limit data dissemination to those 
involved in a financial transaction (ex. prospective financier and buyer) whereas scheduled reporting 
typically involves disclosure via a web platform to the public at large (Northeast Energy Efficiency 
Partnerships, 2013). 
TRI reports were criticized because the data to be disclosed was due “more than a year after [the 
emissions] took place” (Graham & Miller, 2001, p. 18). This delay is a challenge for actors who use the 
data to pressure the firm for behaviour change. 
It can therefore be expected that policy makers designing the disclosure requirements for an energy 
benchmarking policy will seek to: 
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1. Use scheduled disclosure, as opposed to triggered disclosure, to allow for predictable disclosure, 
and time series data 
2. Require timely public disclosure 
3.8 – Audience 
Transparency attains the desired policy goal when it influences the decisions of both consumers and 
producers (Fung & Wright, 2003). However, both consumers and producers of information reach 
information saturation. Simon (1955) proposed the “satisficing principle” to describe the situation 
where firms “apply rules of thumb and routines” as they are unable to “acquire and process all relevant 
information” (Blok et al., 2004, pg. 24). Applied more generally to include consumers and civil society, 
the satisficing principle speaks to competing demands for the attention of data consumers. (Weil, 
Graham, & Fung, Targeting Transparency, 2013). For data to influence consumers, the data must be 
“made available to the prospective consumer at the point of purchase or consumption” as useable 
information (Bui, 2002, p. 4). In the commercial real estate market, policy makers seeking to improve 
energy efficiency through disclosure must fight to be heard over data on pricing, characteristics of the 
building including square footage and location, walkability scores, and even competing environmental 
ratings such as LEED.  
The high level of informational static highlights the importance of disclosing only the information that 
will have the greatest impact; that which information consumers most value. The challenge continues, 
however, because “a national real estate investment trust that owns a particular office building may 
respond differently to new regulations or shifting tenant demands than a family firm that owns and 
manages a small portfolio of buildings in a specific market” (Kontokosta, 2013, p. 39). Consumers must 
be able to easily compare and “distinguish between different products according to their 
characteristics” (Markard & Holt, 2003, p. 1461). This requires “a thorough understanding about 
consumer preferences and knowledge” (Markard & Holt, 2003, p. 1462). For example, Aasen & Lindberg 
(2010) found that consumers prefer data to be presented in a pie chart for the power supply mix, where 
a bar graph was preferred for emissions. Terminology such as “system power” was deemed to be too 
technical (Aasen & Lindberg, 2010). In the case of benchmarking policies, this is complicated by the 
plurality of information consumers. Energy and sustainability professionals employed by large firms will 
demand different information than the general public (Aasen & Lindberg, 2010). Therefore, different 
types of buildings and different types of owners may require different types of education and incentives 
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to meet the policy goals. Energy benchmarking policies should consider options for presenting data that 
accommodates the needs and level of expertise of a given building owner (Graham & Miller, 2001). 
It can therefore be expected that policy makers designing information for different audiences in an 
energy benchmarking policy will seek to: 
1. Develop different disclosure formats to accommodate the preferences and knowledge of 
information consumers 
2. Leverage civil society and associations to disseminate disclosed data and increase pressures on 
polluting firms 
3.9 – Data Submission 
Early benchmarking research has found that the manual entry of energy data causes “significant human 
errors” while being time costly to the building owner and to the government that must validate proper 
entry (Kontokosta, 2013, p. 41).  
The nature of build energy consumption data—mainly produced in standardized formats by utilities—
positions it well for automation which can “significantly reduce the likelihood of data entry errors 
related to manually inputting energy meter information” (Institute for Market Transformation, 2011, p. 
49). Portfolio Manager currently provides the functionality for utilities to upload data on behalf of a 
consenting building owner (Mattern, 2013). This is increasingly becoming the preferred method—in 
terms of data accuracy and encouraging compliance through ease of upload—as a more utilities offer 
ABS.  
When interviewed by Cox et al., a manager of one benchmarking policy said that if the jurisdiction were 
to begin again, “aggregated building data rules would be the first thing instituted” (Cox et al., p. 3). 
Some utilities and municipalities have been cautious to implement ABS because of technical and privacy 
constraints. California passed a bill requiring all electric and gas utilities to keep one year of energy 
consumption records for all non-residential buildings in a format which can be uploaded direct to 
Portfolio Manager (Cahill, 2012). 
It can be expected that policy-makers designing the data submission component of an energy 
benchmarking policy will seek to: 
1. Automate data submission in partnership with utilities to lower time cost and increase accuracy 
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3.10 - Compliance 
Much of the criticism surrounding the TRI—and similar targeted transparency policies—is directed 
towards data and compliance issues. To re-quote Gupta, for targeted transparency policies “the very act 
of disclosing information is central to achieving various aims” (Gupta, 2010, p. 2). If the data cannot be 
trusted, the influence that it will have in adjusting behaviour will be diminished. Challenges identified 
with the data accuracy and compliance for the TRI include: 
 Estimated Data: Submissions are not based on actual measured emissions, but are instead industry 
estimates of emission releases (Wolf, 1996). Allowing firms to estimate the emissions produced 
permits “accidental and intentional underreporting” (Fung & O'Rourke, 2000, p. 7). Energy 
benchmarking policies do not avoid these challenges entirely, as will be discussed below, but the 
data is generally more reliable because building owners are required to report source energy data; 
normally off bills from a utility.  
 Accounting Changes Instead of Physical Changes: Natan and Miller (1998) found firms to have 
made “paper changes” which claim reductions without any physical emission reductions. These 
paper changes are possible because firms are granted considerable leeway in establishing the 
accounting parameters. An example is the “redefinition of on-site recycling as ‘in-process recovery’ 
[which] has resulted in significant paper reductions” (Fung & O'Rourke, 2000, p. 8). If widespread, 
these behaviours could call into question the veracity of the reductions attributed to TRI. Energy 
benchmarking policies avoid this challenge through the use of ENERGY STAR and Portfolio Manager. 
Under this system, it is the EPA and not the building owner that establishes the accounting 
methodology.  
 Insufficient Data Verification: The EPA inspects approximately 3% of TRI reporting firms each year 
(Fung & O'Rourke, 2000). Bui found that the data is “riddled with errors, ranging from the merely 
typographical to some that may be indicative of more serious problems” (Bui, 2002, p. 5). Bui goes 
on to say that “if the public has no confidence in the accuracy of the data and the government 
cannot assure the public of its accuracy, disclosure will to that extent be ineffective” (Bui, 2002, p. 
5). Kontokosta agrees that a “lack of confidence” in the quality of the information being disclosed 
“undermines the usefulness of the information, thus making it less likely to be used in future 
decision-making processes” (Kontokosta, 2013, p. 38). For energy benchmarking policies, basic levels 
of verification are built into the tool, but municipalities are required to conduct verification of data 
after each submission period.  
37 
 
The Institute for Market Transformation (2011) recommends that jurisdictions conduct periodic random 
and targeted audits of benchmarking data in order to ensure accuracy. Where problems are found, 
these should be communicated to stakeholders to reduce accidental errors. Additionally, the Institute 
recommends requiring all building owners and consultants to sign benchmark data to increase 
accountability and compliance. When building owners fail to comply with the policy it is important to 
issue a penalty which is capable of incentivizing desired behaviour. Compliance challenges for Europe’s 
benchmarking policy has been attributed to a lack of proper enforcement including “sending warnings 
to noncompliant parties, issuing fines or openly denoting noncompliance where benchmarking 
information is published online” (Institute for Market Transformation, 2011, p. 47). 
Kontokosta (2013) found other challenges in the early years of New York’s benchmarking policy, 
including “uncertainty over variable definitions and the proper method for handling unique building- 
and lot-specific circumstances” and “limited access to some of the require information, such as a 
consistent source for gross building square footage” (p. 37-38). 
The academic literature directly discussing benchmarking does not address issues of outreach, training 
and support to increase compliance. Research is required to identify best practices for educating 
building owners and consultants on proper data submission and avenues for increasing energy 
efficiency, tenants and financiers on the importance of the disclosed data for informing their decisions, 
and civil society on ways in which this data can support their mission.  
The Institute for Market Transformation (2011), in a scan of existing policies and director-level 
interviews of benchmarking practitioners, does recommends several action items for jurisdictions to 
take for outreach, training and support of building owners and supporting consultants. These include: 
1. Direct Contact: Reach out through mail or phone to building owners and managers to explain 
policy and compliance requirements. 
2. Identify Partners: During rollout, look to stakeholders in the real estate industry to act as 
ambassadors within the industry and for media. Owners of buildings with existing ENERGY STAR 
ratings may be a useful starting point.  Identify potential partners—including associations such 
as BOMA, utilities, civil society, and other government agencies—to support efforts by 
conducting training sessions and outreach activities. 
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3. Conduct Training: Provide training that corresponds with the building type classifications used 
by ENERGY STAR including hotel and office space. The EPA has existing resources to support 
some of this training.  
4. Ongoing assistance: Offer a help centre for building owners and managers to call for questions 
on the program and assistance working past data submission problems.  
It can be expected that policy-makers designing the compliance component of an energy benchmarking 
policy will seek to: 
1. Prioritize data quality through thorough verification of data each reporting period 
2. Have robust enforcement which signals to the market that compliance is in fact mandatory 
3. Conduct periodic audits to verify reporting accuracy 
4. Offer training and support for disclosers on data submission and behaviour improvement 
3.11 – Adaptation 
For a disclosure policy to remain effective it must evolve, as “systems that do not keep pace with 
changing markets and public priorities can become counter-productive” (Fung et al., 2002, p. 37). After 
its initial success, the rate of decline of chemicals reported under TRI began to slow. The EPA suggests 
that this decline occurred because “some manufacturers were able to make relatively inexpensive and 
rapid changes in the early years of TRI reporting” and further decreases would have necessitated costly 
new processes or products (Graham & Miller, 2001, p. 12). Additionally, macroeconomic growth 
continued to drive absolute growth (Graham & Miller, 2001). For benchmarking policies, a similar 
trajectory could be experienced by which simple recommissioning and low-cost upgrades generate 
significant early reductions, and then decline after the so-called low-hanging fruit is exploited.  
 
Policy makers may evolve disclosure policies by either amending the existing policy or implementing 
additional requirements. Bui (2002) argues that the most significant impact of TRI and the means by 
which it drove business action is by providing state and local government with the information and 
incentive required to create command-and-control regulation. In addition to policy makers, Fung & 
O’Rourke (2000) finds that TRI is often used by civil society to pressure for stronger environmental 
policies. Carol Dansereau of the Washington Toxics Coalition is quoted as saying that her goal in using 
the TRI is to “build more regulation, more implementation of existing regulations, and more 
enforcement” (Fung & O'Rourke, 2000, p. 19). An example is the state of Louisiana that was identified in 
1989 as having the third highest level of toxic emissions in the country. After receiving negative pressure 
39 
 
from media and civil society, the state enacted anti-toxic laws that lowered toxic emissions levels by 
50% in 7 years (Fung & O'Rourke, 2000). 
In terms of energy benchmarking policies, previously unavailable data allows cities and utilities to target 
poorly performing buildings with educational programs, financial incentives, and policies such as 
mandatory energy audits. (Kontokosta, 2013). 
It can be expected that policy-makers designing an energy benchmarking policy will seek to: 
1. Analyze incoming data to identify ways to improve the policy 
2. Implement additional policies to complement benchmarking policies after several years in 
existence 
3.12 –Question #1: Which policy components does theory suggest that jurisdictions should select? 
Table 11 responds to the first question that this thesis seeks to address: 
Question #1: Which policy components does theory suggest that jurisdictions should select? 
The literature describes a policy with the stated objectives to create a more efficient market through the 
provision of information which will alter consumer behaviour and, in doing so, influence the discloser to 
modify behaviour. Additionally, benchmarking policies are intended to influence behaviour of the 
discloser directly by communicating new information which highlights previously unknown 
opportunities for improvement. It is deemed important to correct for principal-agent problems and to 
overcome limitations of traditional command-and-control approaches. Cities are expected to design 
these policies by engaging a wide array of relevant industry and civil society stakeholders. 
The number and type of buildings covered by the policies should be limited to lower implementation 
costs while maximizing the impact, and should be phased in over several years to allow for institutional 
learning and the market of supporting consultants to develop. 
The information provided to data consumers should be targeted towards the needs of the consumer in 
order to ensure that it is understood and can properly influence decision-making. The use of scheduled 
disclosure will allow for more useful data and the ability to engage civil society and associations in the 
dissemination of data and pressuring of firms. 
To increase compliance and improve data quality, submission should be automated in partnership with 
utilities, however verification of data and periodic audits should be conducted to ensure quality. Robust 
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enforcement and penalties, in consort with dissemination of information to stakeholders on apparent 
accidental data errors should additionally be used to limit non-compliance and poor data quality. Assist 
buildings in complying, and responding through improved behaviour, with the policy through building-
type customized training, call centre support, and direct reach outs. Industry stakeholders are important 
partners that should be leveraged for publicizing the program and offering of training. 
Cities should actively monitor incoming data to look for opportunities to improve the policy so that it 
remains relevant and useful for both information disclosers and consumers. The literature was not 
specific as to what types of amendments may be impactful. 
Finally, jurisdictions should consider the costs and benefits of implementing an energy benchmarking 
policy against other possible policy options for achieving their goals in order to ensure that 
benchmarking is actually the right approach.  
Table 61. Theoretical Policy Component Selection 
Question #1: Which policy components does theory suggest that jurisdictions should select? 
Policy Component Theoretical Expectation 
Stated Policy 
Objectives 
1. Inability of command-and-control policies to capture the complexity of 
buildings 
2. Need for policy-makers to have additional information to craft more 
effective regulations 
3. Correct for principal-agent problems by providing the information to 
encourage mutually beneficial solutions 
4. To create a more efficient market by providing information to key 
stakeholders including prospective tenants, buyers, and financiers 
5. Low-cost of a benchmarking policy relative to traditional command-and-
control policies 
6. To reduce information failures, and to allow for the proper pricing and 
discount rate to increase adoption of efficient technologies 
7. Improve a specific and measurable environmental metric 
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Adoption Process 1. Engage a wide array of stakeholders in the design process 
2. Ensure the information provided will be integrated into the existing 
decision processes of consumers 
3. Understand how disclosers will interpret and respond to behaviour 
change from consumers. 
4. Use federally produced resources and civil society publicizing to reduce 
costs 
5. Consider the costs and benefits of the policy in the design documents so 
as to identify whether benchmarking is the right approach for meeting 
energy goals  
Coverage & 
Implementation 
Schedule 
1. Limit the type of buildings covered by the policy in heterogeneous 
markets and where there are a large number of actors 
2. Focus on large emitters to increase the impact relative to the 
administrative cost 
3. Phase in coverage over several years in order to allow for institutional 
learning and program improvement, and to allow market of engineers 
and consultants to build capacity 
Disclosure 
Requirements 
1. Require public disclosure 
2. Use scheduled disclosure, as opposed to triggered disclosure, to allow for 
predictable disclosure, and time series data 
Audience 1. Develop different disclosure formats to accommodate the preferences 
and knowledge of information consumers 
2. Leverage civil society and associations to disseminate disclosed data and 
increase pressures on polluting firms 
Compliance 1. Have robust enforcement which signals to the market that compliance is 
in fact mandatory 
2. Conduct periodic audits to verify reporting accuracy (see Adaptation 
below) 
3. Prioritize data quality through thorough verification of data each 
reporting period 
42 
 
4. Offer training and support for disclosers on data submission and 
behaviour improvement 
Data Submission 1. Automate data submission in partnership with utilities to lower time cost 
and increase accuracy 
Adaptation 1. Analyze incoming data to identify ways to improve the policy 
2. Implement additional policies to complement benchmarking policies 
after several years in existence 
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Chapter 4 - Energy Benchmarking in the United States 
4.1 – Chapter Overview 
This chapter highlights the importance of ENERGY STAR as a program and methodology to 
benchmarking policies in the United States, and tracks the evolution of ENERGY STAR to provide a lens 
through which to view emerging benchmarking trends.  
4.2 – Relationship between ENERGY STAR and Benchmarking Policies 
As previously identified, all of the benchmarking policies within the research sample make use of 
ENERGY STAR and its Portfolio Manager platform. Municipalities adopt ENERGY STAR because it has 
established itself as the industry standard through voluntary participation, is nation-wide and easily 
comparable, and lowers the start-up costs of a new program by relying on existing federal infrastructure 
(Burr, Keicher, & Leipziger, 2011). While the focus of this thesis is on municipal policies requiring 
commercial buildings to benchmark, it is important to first develop a basic understanding of the 
underlying ENERGY STAR methodology on which the policies rely.  
Energy benchmarking policies require the participation of (1) ENERGY STAR, (2) a city, (3) information 
discloser, and (4) information consumer. Table 12 lists the role of each of these actors (with discloser 
and information consumers grouped together for brevity). The design of a benchmarking policy is 
primarily the responsibility of ENERGY STAR and the city. ENERGY STAR provides and continues to 
develop its Portfolio Manager tool—including the underlying methodology—while the city works with 
local stakeholders to design the enacting policy. In implementation, ENERGY STAR has only a minor role 
as the technical expert and platform provider, while the city and information discloser/consumer work 
together to acquire the necessary data. During reporting, the discloser is supported by the city to submit 
data through Portfolio Manager and ENERGY STAR then returns a benchmarked score. Behaviour change 
is the responsibility of both the city which will seek policy avenues to address the conclusions of the 
information, and of information producers/consumers who internalize the information before changing 
behaviour.  
Table 12. Role of ENERGY STAR, City, Disclosers, and Information Consumers 
Phase ENERGY STAR Role City Role Information Discloser / 
Consumer Role 
1. Design  Develop & Provide 
Portfolio Manager 
reporting tool 
 Develop underlying 
reporting 
 Engage local 
stakeholders in 
design 
 Enact policy which 
defines building 
 Provide feedback to 
City on policy design 
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methodology which 
converts energy 
data into a 
benchmarked score 
coverage (ex. size & 
type), non-
compliance 
penalties, method 
of submission, etc 
 Build outreach & 
training capacity 
2. Implementation  Provide technical 
assistance for using 
Portfolio Manager 
 Conduct outreach, 
training 
 Enforce compliance 
 Develop internal 
capacity to comply 
with policy 
3. Reporting  Collect data and 
return benchmarked 
score 
 (Optional) Work 
with utilities to 
develop automatic 
data uploading 
 Provide support to 
information 
producers 
 Aggregate and 
analyze data for 
city-wide lessons 
 Engage tenants to 
retrieve required 
data 
 Submit data either 
directly to Portfolio 
Manager or through 
automated utility 
offering 
4. Behaviour 
Change 
 n/a  Based on results, 
create new policies 
or update existing 
policies to change 
behaviour 
 Information 
consumers demand 
efficiency 
improvement 
 Information 
producers improve 
efficiency 
4.3 - The History and Impact of ENERGY STAR and Portfolio Manager 
The ENERGY STAR label can be found on everything from appliances and office equipment, to homes 
and commercial buildings. The program was launched in 1992 as “a voluntary government program that 
reduces air pollution through increased energy efficiency [which informs] businesses and consumers 
about energy efficient solutions and makes it easier to save money and protect the environment for 
future generations” (Boyd, Dutrow, & Tunnessen, 2008, p. 709).     
In 1999, ENERGY STAR launched a new Commercial Buildings Program (Mattern, 2013). This expansion 
built upon similar rating and disclosure programs in Europe and Australia (Cox, Brown, & Sun, 2013). The 
EPA designed ENERGY STAR to support “management practices that result in superior corporate energy 
performance and provide the management tools that enable energy efficiency” (Boyd et al., 2008, p. 
710).  By identifying energy efficiency improvements in buildings, ENERGY STAR provides managers with 
direction and evidence to support the energy reduction goal setting of an organization (Boyd et al., 
2008). 
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It is important to make the distinction between ENERGY STAR reporting, rating, and certification. To 
participate in ENERGY STAR, a building must report energy consumption through the Portfolio Manager 
tool. Any building type may report consumption data and receive their EUI. If an ENERGY STAR rating 
has been developed for the given building type, “Portfolio Manager provides a 1-100 rating for a 
building's energy performance in a given year. A score of 50 represents the average and a 75 or higher 
represents superior performance. A score of 1 signifies the lowest possible energy performance, and 
each additional point represents a one percentile improvement.” If the building receives an ENERGY 
STAR rating between 75-100, it may apply for certification and the right to use the ENERGY STAR label 
(Mattern, 2013, p. 494). 
The first ENERGY STAR for commercial buildings rating was specifically for office buildings, but today 
approximately 60% of commercial square footage (see Figure 2) in the US has access to an ENERGY STAR 
rating and certification label designed to account for building type particulars. Buildings types which do 
not have a dedicated rating are still able to track and report energy through ENERGY STAR, but do not 
receive a performance rating or ENERGY STAR certification label (US Environmental Protection Agency's 
ENERGY STAR, 2011). The process for developing a rating system and usage of the Portfolio Manager 
reporting tool will be described later in this chapter.   
Figure 2. Commercial Building Types with Corresponding ENERGY STAR Rating System 
 Data Centres 
 Dormitories 
 Hospitals 
 Hotels 
 Houses of Worship 
 K-12 Schools 
 Medical Offices 
 Office Buildings, Bank/Financial 
Institutions, and Courthouses 
 Retail Stores 
 Super Markets 
 Warehouses 
 Wastewater Treatment Plants 
(US Environmental Protection Agency's ENERGY STAR, 2011, p. 2) 
Reported results show that “on average, ENERGY STAR certified buildings use 35% less energy and cause 
35% fewer greenhouse gas emissions than similar buildings” (ENERGY STAR, n.d.). These certified 
buildings represent a small subsection of all buildings that report via ENERGY STAR as a building 
must perform at or above the 75th percentile to be eligible for certification (Nikolaou et al., 2011). 
Less efficient buildings also experience benefits from participating in ENERGY STAR. The EPA reports 
that buildings that consistently benchmark receive average annual energy savings of 2.4% compared to 
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business-as-usual. Additionally, the EPA found that “buildings starting with below average energy 
efficiency in 2008 saved twice as much energy as those starting above average” (US Environmental 
Protection Agency's ENERGY STAR, 2012, p. 1). This is a significant finding as it helps to alleviate 
concerns that mandatory energy benchmarking policies could penalize underperforming buildings that 
are simply not able to increase efficiency. While programs and policies are rarely beneficial for 
everyone, the fast-paced savings achieved by low-performing buildings in the EPA study suggests that 
they were likely missing low-hanging fruit prior to recognizing the opportunities identified by 
benchmarking. It will be interesting to see if this trend holds as buildings are required by municipal 
policies to benchmark, or if voluntary participation incentivized only the below average performing-
buildings with the greatest potential to opt-in to ENERGY STAR. 
 With the advent of the first benchmarking policies, ENERGY STAR continues to evolve its role and 
impact. Figure 3. shows that the use of ENERGY STAR has increased significantly among commercial 
buildings. As we will see in 5.2 – Stated Policy Objectives, this increase aligns with the adoption of 
mandatory energy benchmarking policies, beginning with Austin in 2007 and New York in 2008. At the 
end of 2014, when all of the policies within this thesis’ sample were active, ENERGY STAR reports its 
rating system was being used by over 400,000 commercial buildings representing 35 billion square feet 
of real-estate. Top performing buildings which received an ENERGY STAR certification (requiring 
performance at or above the 75th percentile) have reported cumulative cost savings of $3.4 billion and 
GHG reductions of 17 million MtCO2e (ENERGY STAR, n.d.). The increase in adoption that is seen in 
Figure 3 refers solely to the act of benchmarking and does not necessarily mean that any corrective 
action was taken to increase building efficiency. In other words, you can report your energy 
consumption and then take no steps to improve your performance. That said, it takes time to track data, 
identify opportunities, upgrade facilities, and then apply for ENERGY STAR certification, it can be 
expected that the aforementioned impacts attributed to ENERGY STAR will increase substantially in the 
coming years. 
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In addition to the direct and measured benefits, ENERGY STAR has created an impact as a platform and 
inspiration for other building rating systems including the US Green Building Council’s Leadership in 
Energy and Environment Design (LEED) rating system, and for tools offered by both the Building Owners 
and Managers Association (BOMA) and the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating, and Air-
Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE) (ENERGY STAR, n.d.). 
4.4 - ENERGY STAR Methodology and Portfolio Manager 
The EPA’s approach for developing a rating system is designed to “provide an accurate and equitable 
assessment of a building's energy performance” (US Environmental Protection Agency's ENERGY STAR, 
2011, p. 4). The criteria to guide this approach are: 
1.  “Evaluate energy performance for the whole building” as opposed to individual equipment such as 
an HVAC system which may be efficient on its own but over-sized for the needs of the building (US 
Environmental Protection Agency's ENERGY STAR, 2011, p. 4). 
2. “Reflect actual billed energy data” by requiring utility data to be inputted into Portfolio Manager 
since simulations often do not properly account for the impact of building operations and 
maintenance (US Environmental Protection Agency's ENERGY STAR, 2011, p. 4). 
3. “Normalize for operation” to account for the buildings operational characteristics such as “hours of 
operation or number of occupants” (US Environmental Protection Agency's ENERGY STAR, 2011, p. 
4). 
Figure 3. Cumulative buildings and square footage benchmarked 
in Portfolio Manager 
(U.S. EPA, 2014) 
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4. “Provide a peer group comparison” so that the rating provides a useful benchmark against buildings 
with a similar business function (ex. hospital or retail store) and operating characteristics (US 
Environmental Protection Agency's ENERGY STAR, 2011, p. 4). 
These criteria, such as tracking whole-building performance and normalizing actually billed energy data, 
not only shape the ENERGY STAR program but also aspects of municipal policies. For example, 
jurisdictions are beginning to automate data uploading directly from utilities in order to overcome 
challenges of getting accurate whole-building data (Burr et al., 2011). This local action is only possible 
because Portfolio Manager includes the functionality of automated data uploading. 
At its core, ENERGY STAR Portfolio Manager is a statistical analysis tool that relies primarily upon the US 
Energy Information Administration’s Commercial Building Energy Consumption Survey (CBECS), which is 
“a national survey that assesses the characteristics, consumption and expenditures of the commercial 
building population” (Mattern, 2013, p. 491). CBECS collects “complete billing data and operational 
details” for 6,000 commercial buildings representing a wide variety of types (US Environmental 
Protection Agency's ENERGY STAR, 2011, p. 4). ENERGY STAR uses CBECS to develop an average 
performance of “a building based on its type, space attribute data, location, and energy consumption by 
fuel type” (Mattern, 2013, p. 493). The existence of CBECS is important as “gathering energy information 
to fill a database with a representative sample of the building stock is not only expensive, but also 
technically complex” (Nikolaou et al., 2011, p. 58). 
It is important to recognize that by using CBECS, a building benchmarked through ENERGY STAR is not 
compared with other “real” buildings entered into Portfolio Manager or those in the same 
benchmarking jurisdiction, but rather against the national average. The EPA selected this approach in 
order to ensure a nationally representative and statistically valid dataset (ENERGY STAR). New York and 
other cities with benchmarking policies are now exploring, in partnership with the EPA, the possibility of 
using the large local datasets as an additional layer to allow for local benchmarking with scores that are 
reflective of performance within a jurisdiction and real estate market (New York City Mayor's Office of 
Long-Term Planning and Sustainability, 2014).  
The EPA applies normalizing screens to the CBECS survey because two seemingly identical buildings 
could have markedly different consumption patterns if, for example, they exist in different parts of the 
country and with different types of occupants. For benchmarking to be useful, the EPA creates “peer 
groups” of US commercial buildings “that have the same primary business function and similar operating 
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characteristics” (US Environmental Protection Agency's ENERGY STAR, 2011, p. 10). The EPA performs a 
series of regression tests on the CBECS that allow “for analysis of a dependent variable (ex. source 
energy use intensity), subject to various independent characteristics (ex. operation and weather)” (US 
Environmental Protection Agency's ENERGY STAR, 2011, p. 5). These regression tests are performed on 
the CBECS dataset and not on individual buildings entered into Portfolio Manager. The end result is a 
predicted source EUI based on the constraints of the building (the independent variables). The actual, or 
reported, source EUI of buildings in the CBECS is divided by the predicted source EUI to calculate the 
energy efficiency ratio. This ratio is used to build the ENERGY STAR Lookup Table which is then used to 
assign an ENERGY STAR performance rating. "For example, the ratio on the [curve] at 1% corresponds to 
a rating of 99; only 1% of the population has a ratio this small or smaller” (US Environmental Protection 
Agency's ENERGY STAR, 2011, p. 12). More simply, the ratio shows how well a building is living up to its 
potential as compared with a representative sample of its peers. 
The dependent variable used by ENERGY STAR is the source energy use intensity (source EUI) of a 
building. The purpose of conducting a regression analysis is to explain how the dependent variable is 
influenced by the independent variables. In the case of ENERGY STAR, it is to determine the “variation in 
source EUI associated with each of the independent variables” (US Environmental Protection Agency's 
ENERGY STAR, 2011, p. 7). Source EUI can be broken apart into the two concepts of: 
 Source Energy: The energy used by a building can come in the form of electricity generated by a 
utility, or onsite through combustion of a fuel such as natural gas. Whereas natural gas 
represents a raw fuel (primary energy), the electricity represents a useable form of energy that 
has been converted from a raw fuel (secondary energy). ENERGY STAR converts all energy 
recorded on utility bills (site energy) to primary (source) energy in order to allow for comparison 
(US Environmental Protection Agency's ENERGY STAR, 2011). National average ratios are used to 
convert site to source energy because “the key unit of analysis for Portfolio Manager is the 
building. It is the efficiency of the building, not the utility, which is evaluated” (U.S. EPA's 
ENERGY STAR, 2013, p. 4). In practice this means that a building in a state that relies on coal for 
electricity is not held at a disadvantage to a building in a state that relies on hydro. 
 Energy Use Intensity: EUI is the most commonly used metric to compare energy performance 
within a sample peer group. Similar to intensity metrics in greenhouse gas accounting, EUI can 
be calculated as energy use per worker in an office building, energy use per bed in a hotel, or 
energy use per square foot (Nikolaou et al., 2011). ENERGY STAR uses the latter, “dividing the 
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total source energy defined above by the gross floor area of the building” (US Environmental 
Protection Agency's ENERGY STAR, 2011). 
 
As mentioned, the independent variables the EPA is concerned with are factors that could influence the 
source EUI of a building. The independent variable examples listed above—“operation” and “weather”—
can be understood as: 
 Weather conditions: Data is normalized to remove the impacts of scenarios such as 
temperature differences between Austin and Seattle, or the impact of a stronger hurricane 
season on New York compared to previous years (Chung, Review of building energy-use 
performance benchmarking methodologies, 2011). Specifically, weather conditions incorporated 
into ENERGY STAR include “average daily temperature, temperature maximum and minimum 
values, humidity, and cloud cover” (US Environmental Protection Agency's ENERGY STAR, 2011, 
p. 9). For example, ENERGY STAR calculates Heating Degree Days and Cooling Degree Days as a 
deviation from a standard temperature of 65F, tallied annually as the sum of deviations over the 
entire year (US Environmental Protection Agency's ENERGY STAR, 2011). 
 Occupancy uses: New York’s benchmarking found occupancy uses to be a significant 
differentiator in the EUI of a building (New York City Mayor's Office of Long-Term Planning and 
Sustainability, 2014). For example, a standard office tower uses energy differently than a mixed-
use office tower that has a grocery store on the main floor which uses energy-intensive 
refrigerators (Chung, Review of building energy-use performance benchmarking methodologies, 
2011). 
Top performing buildings are eligible to apply for an ENERGY STAR certification, similar in intent to the 
US Green Building Council’s LEED certification as a demonstration of organizational leadership. The 
performance scale and ENERGY STAR rating is only available for certain types of buildings as “developing 
a scale that accounts for the operative characteristics of each building requires access to nationally 
representative, statistically robust survey data” (US Environmental Protection Agency's ENERGY STAR, 
2011, p. 2). This is not yet possible for all building types. In the case of building types for which an 
energy performance scale has not yet been created, the “EPA provides average energy use per square 
foot derived from the [Commercial Buildings Energy Consumption Survey] data” (US Environmental 
Protection Agency's ENERGY STAR, 2011, p. 2). Additional ENERGY STAR performance scales are 
developed on an ongoing basis. 
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The ENERGY STAR methodology can be most easily understood from the perspective of a building 
manager. Figure 4. Steps to Compute an ENERGY STAR Rating using Portfolio Manager4 summarizes the 
steps required of a building manager to compute a rating, beginning with entering building (ex. primary 
use of building, number of workers, size of building, hours of operation) and consumption (ex. electricity 
consumption from utility bill) data into Portfolio Manager. The actual and predicted source energy 
intensities, and corresponding efficiency ratio, are calculated. The ratio is used to pull a rating between 
1-100 from the Lookup Table. If the rating is between 75-100, the building may apply for an ENERGY 
STAR certification (U.S. EPA, n.d.).  
Figure 4. Steps to Compute an ENERGY STAR Rating using Portfolio Manager 
Excerpt from the EPA document  
ENERGY STAR Performance Ratings – Technical Methodology 
 
1. User enters building data into Portfolio Manager  
 Complete energy information includes all energy consumption at the building for a 12-month 
period.  
 The user must enter specific operational characteristic data. These characteristics are those 
included as independent variables in the EPA regression analysis.  
2. Portfolio Manager computes the Actual Source Energy Use Intensity  
 Source EUI is computed from the metered energy data.  
 The total consumption for each energy meter entered by the user is converted into source 
energy using the source to site conversion factors.  
 Source EUI is the sum of source energy across all meters in the building divided by the gross 
floor area. 
3. Portfolio Manager computes the Predicted Source Energy Intensity  
 Predicted Source EUI is computed using the regression equation for the specific building type.  
 For each operating characteristic entered by the user, the centered value is computed. The 
centered value is the difference between the user-entered value and the mean value in the 
CBECS population.  
 The terms in the regression equation are summed to yield a predicted source EUI.  
 The prediction reflects the expected energy use for the building, given its specific operational 
constraints. 
4. Portfolio Manager computes the energy efficiency ratio  
 The energy efficiency ratio is: Actual Source EUI / Predicted Source EUI 
 The energy efficiency ratio expresses how much energy a building uses relative to its 
predicted energy use. A lower ratio indicates that a building uses less energy; a higher ratio 
indicates the opposite. 
5. Portfolio Manager looks up the efficiency ratio in the Lookup Table 
 The lookup table maps each energy efficiency ratio to a cumulative percent in the population.  
 The lookup table identifies whether the energy efficiency ratio for a building is bigger or 
smaller than the ratios of its peers.  
 The lookup table returns a rating on a scale of 1-to-100.  
 A rating of 75 indicates that the building performs better than 75% of its peers.  
 Buildings that earn a 75 or higher may be eligible to earn the ENERGY STAR.  
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(US Environmental Protection Agency's ENERGY STAR, 2011, p. 12-13) 
 
Chapter 5 – Active Municipal Benchmarking Policies 
5.1 – Chapter Overview 
This chapter presents case studies, divided across eight policy components, of the seven active 
jurisdictions. Trends are identified for each policy component where a simple majority of the 
jurisdictions have selected a given design variable. The purpose of this chapter is to address the second 
question of this thesis: “Which policy components do jurisdictions select and are there apparent 
trends?” 
5.2 – Stated Policy Objectives 
All seven policies in the sample have been enacted between 2008 and 2013 with the earliest results 
publicly reported by New York’s Local Law 84 in August 2012. As shown in Table , four out of the seven 
policies were enacted in 2012 and 2013. This narrow gap between the implementation of pioneering 
policies and the next iteration of policies allows for the possibility that the early results legitimized and 
enticed others to follow suit. This is a view that is supported by the policy objectives (covered below in 
Table ) of Boston which refers to preceding policies by stating, “New York City, Seattle, San Francisco, 
Minneapolis, Philadelphia, Austin, and Washington, D.C., have demonstrated benchmarking’s 
acceptability & feasibility” (City of Boston, 2013, p. 1). When Austin implemented its leading policy in 
2008, it too conducted a scan but was only able to look for guidance from policies that targeted 
residential energy efficiency such as the State of Nevada and Berkeley, California (Energy Efficiency 
Upgrades Task Force - City of Austin, 2008). Senior levels of government are also important drivers for 
the adoption of benchmarking policies with San Francisco recognizing California's Long Term Energy 
Efficiency Strategic Plan goal of attaining a scenario where “fifty percent of existing [commercial] 
buildings will be equivalent to zero net energy buildings by 2030 through achievement of deep levels of 
energy efficiency and clean distributed generation” (Mayor's Task Force on Existing Buildings, p. 3). If 
the sample benchmarking policies produce positive results, and states continue to set forward-looking 
goals, other cities may similarly appeal to this demonstrated feasibility as they adopt their own 
benchmarking policies. 
Table 13. Date of Enactment of Benchmarking Policies 
Adapted from Institute for Market Transformation (n.d.) 
Jurisdiction Policy Name Authority in Charge Enacted Date 
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Austin Energy Conservation Audit & 
Disclosure Ordinance 
Austin Electric Utility 2008 
Boston Building Energy Reporting and 
Disclosure Ordinance 
Air Pollution Control 
Commission 
2013 
Chicago Energy Use Benchmarking 
Ordinance 
Commissioner of Business 
Affairs and Consumer 
Protection 
2013 
New York Local Law 84 Department of Buildings 2009 
Philadelphia 
 
Building Energy Benchmarking 
Ordinance 
Office of Sustainability 2012 
San 
Francisco  
Existing Commercial Buildings 
Energy Performance 
Ordinance 
Department of Environment 2011 
Seattle City of Seattle Energy 
Benchmarking and Report 
Program (Ordinance 123226) 
Office of Sustainability and 
Environment 
2012 
While all cities made some mention of their policy objectives for advancing a benchmarking policy, a few 
cities include explanations that are noticeably more thorough and thoughtful. Table 4 categorizes the 
stated policy objectives into the broad areas of Energy & Environment; Economic; Political, Policy & 
Planning; Human & Health; and Other (summaries can be found in Appendix A - Policy Motivations & 
Impact Estimates) 
The stated policy objectives most often cited were found to be GHG reductions (71%) and energy 
efficiency (57%), cost savings for ratepayers (57%), an often generally worded increase in transparency 
(57%), a desire to improve management decision making through the provision of information (43%), 
and the need to bring existing buildings inline with new building code efficiency regulations (43%). 
The greenhouse gas emissions attributed to buildings as a percentage of total emissions vary markedly 
across the cities, with Boston reporting approximately 75%, Chicago 71%, Philadelphia 60%, and San 
Francisco 50%. (City of Boston, 2013; City of Chicago, 2014; City of Philadelphia, 2014). This variance in 
GHG emissions could be the result of differences in building stock, urban form, local energy mix, or 
accounting procedures. Regardless of the percentage, GHG emissions are a strong motivator for cities to 
adopt benchmarking policies. San Francisco acknowledge that scientific and federal agencies 
recommend an 80% reduction in GHG emissions by 2050 which amounts to a 2.5% annual 
decarbonisation or energy reduction, “sustained for a generation” (Mayor's Task Force on Existing 
Buildings, 2009, p. 3). 
Two explicit recognitions of the impacts of climate change were included. Boston stated in the opening 
paragraph of its ordinance that climate change causes "sea-level rise, higher temperatures, and more 
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intense storms" (City of Boston, 2013, p. 1).  San Francisco went even further by directly connecting the 
impacts of climate change to the city itself: 
“Documented phenomena in California include warming temperatures, precipitation disruptions, 
reductions in average Sierra snowpack and changes in timing of spring runoff. Projections for the 
remainder of the century continue to grow more ominous with profound implications for the 
provision of clean water, hydroelectric generation, and the agriculture that feeds our city. As a City 
bounded by water on three sides, coastal inundation is a continuing threat to our community, real 
estate and infrastructure” (Mayor's Task Force on Existing Buildings, 2009, p. 1). 
In four (57%) of the cities, the policies are inspired by or linked to an existing climate or energy plan, or 
senior level government leadership. Philadelphia sees benchmarking as offering the “best opportunity to 
achieve the Greenworks [climate action plan] target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions 20 percent 
by 2015” (City of Philadelphia, 2014, p. 6). Chicago’s 2012 sustainability plan included a call to increase 
building energy efficiency through transparency (City of Chicago's Office of the Mayor, 2013). New York 
City established its benchmarking policy in connection with wider efficiency regulations and energy 
codes (Northeast Energy Efficiency Partnerships, 2013).  
That a climate or energy plan should lead to an interest in energy benchmarking is quite logical. San 
Francisco reports that, although it “has established high standards of environmental performance for 
new construction,” the city adds to its building stock at just 0.8% per year (Mayor's Task Force on 
Existing Buildings, 2009, p. ii) At this pace, San Francisco notes that “it could take more than sixty years 
to ‘green’ even half of San Francisco” (Mayor's Task Force on Existing Buildings, p. ii). Austin also seeks 
to have an impact on the existing stock of “buildings constructed prior to the implementation of current 
energy codes” (City of Austin, 2008, p. 1). Seattle found that if the lower half of its building stock 
achieved median energy efficiency, building owners would realize 25% energy savings and $56.1 million 
of dollar savings (Seattle Office of Sustainability & Environment, 2014).  
Improving transparency was noted as a policy objective by three cities (43%). Seattle recognizes that 
“localized datasets increase transparency and provide greater relevance for planners and utilities than 
national datasets,” and that benchmarking is important for providing “building performance information 
accessible to building owners, industry professionals and policymakers” (Seattle Office of Sustainability 
& Environment, 2014, p. 7).  Philadelphia is less specific in its acknowledgement of the value of 
benchmarking policies to policymakers, saying only that in order to improve efficiency data must be 
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improved (City of Philadelphia, 2014). Chicago is even less clear in the value it hopes to derive from 
benchmarking, describing a desire for increased energy performance transparency (City of Chicago, 
2014). 
Boston and Chicago both look to benchmarking as a potential driver of competitiveness and the green 
economy. Boston sees benchmarking as a tool for spurring the growth of a “green economy and job 
creation”, increase business attractiveness and demonstrate “innovative leadership” (City of Boston, 
2013, p. 1). Chicago does not place a direct focus on the green economy but instead it sees the potential 
for efficiency to increase competitiveness and resiliency through cost savings (City of Chicago, 2014). 
Table 14. Stated Policy Objectives 
Categorization of stated policy objectives identified by cities within design documents, enacted policies, or self-reported results. 
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Energy & 
Environment 
GHG Reduction No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
(71%) 
Energy Efficiency or 
Conservation 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes 
(57%) 
Climatic Change No Yes No No No Yes No No 
(71%) 
Avoided New Supply Yes No No No No No No No 
(86%) 
Economic Cost Savings for Ratepayers Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes 
(57%) 
Spur Green Economy No Yes No No No No No No 
(86%) 
Political, Policy 
and Planning 
Meet Targets in Climate or 
Energy Plan 
Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes 
(57%) 
Bring Existing Buildings up to 
New Building Code 
Yes No No Yes No Yes No No 
(57%) 
Improve Data for Better 
Urban Planning 
No No No No Yes Yes Yes No 
(57%) 
Senior Level of Government 
Directive or Leadership 
No No No No No Yes No No 
(86%) 
Human & Health Reduced Pollution No Yes No No No No No No 
(86%) 
Occupancy Enjoyment No Yes No No No No No No 
(86%) 
Other Increase Transparency No No Yes Yes No No Yes No 
(57%) 
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Table 15 lists the projected impacts of the policies categorized by impact area. A complete list of 
projected impacts can be found in Appendix A - Policy Motivations & Impact Estimates. The most widely 
projected impact was annual cost savings (57%), energy reductions (57%), GHG emission reductions 
(43%), and retrofit investments (43%). Boston and Seattle both provided no projected impacts.  
Table 15. Projected Policy Impacts 
Categorization of policy projected impacts identified by cities within design documents or enacted policies. 
Category Jurisdiction Projected Impact 
Energy reductions Austin 20% increase in energy efficiency by 2020 
Boston n/a 
Chicago 13-23% reduction in consumption by (6.5–11.2 
million MMBTU/year) if all buildings achieved 50th or 
75th percentile EUI respectively. 
New York n/a 
Philadelphia 10% reduction in consumption by 2015 
San Francisco 50% reduction in consumption by 2030 
Seattle n/a 
GHG emission 
reductions (tonnes) 
Austin n/a 
Boston n/a 
Chicago 460,000-844,000 
New York 2,720,000 (5.3%) by 2030 
Philadelphia n/a 
San Francisco 64,000 by 2015 
Seattle n/a 
Cost savings (annual) 
Note: Not stated whether 
amount is only private 
savings or includes 
government savings. 
Assumed private savings as 
the discussion focuses 
primarily on private 
savings. 
Austin $38,593,874 
Boston n/a 
Chicago $44-$77 million 
New York $12.2 billion 
Philadelphia $100 million 
San Francisco n/a 
Seattle n/a 
Retrofit investments 
 
Austin $83,600,000 
Boston n/a 
Chicago $152-$265 million 
New York $5.2 billion 
Philadelphia n/a 
San Francisco n/a 
Seattle n/a 
Job growth Austin n/a 
Improve Building Owner 
Decision Making 
No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(57%) 
Demonstrated Feasibility No Yes No No No No No No 
(86%) 
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Boston n/a 
Chicago “More than 1,000” (City of Chicago, 2014) 
New York Thousands of construction jobs “in energy auditing, 
retro-commissioning, upgrading lighting, and 
maintaining equipment” (New York City Mayor's 
Office of Long-Term Planning and Sustainability, 
2014, p. 3) 
Philadelphia n/a 
San Francisco n/a 
Seattle n/a 
ENERGY STAR score Austin Before June 1, 2016 80% covered building will either: 
 Have an ENERGY STAR score of at least 50, or; 
 Have 20% improvement in efficiency above an 
existing ENERGY STAR score of 50 (City of Austin, 
2008) 
Boston n/a 
Chicago n/a 
New York n/a 
Philadelphia n/a 
San Francisco n/a 
Seattle n/a 
Other Austin n/a 
Boston n/a 
Chicago n/a 
New York  Benchmarking to contribute 10% of reductions 
towards GHG reduction goal of 30% by 2030 
 Improve air quality 
 Improve comfort of indoor environment 
 Increase reliability of electrical systems 
Philadelphia n/a 
San Francisco n/a 
Seattle n/a 
Jurisdictions that reported energy reduction projections most commonly spoke in terms of a reduction 
in consumption (Chicago, Philadelphia, and San Francisco), but an increase in energy efficiency was also 
used (Austin). The generalized and interchangeable fashion in which jurisdictions use the definitions of 
efficiency increase and consumption reduction makes it difficult to discern if a city is speaking in 
intensity or absolute terms. For example, if the entire market reduces consumption by 20% then the 
aggregate consumption will decrease, whereas if all buildings improve efficiency by 20% but the floor 
area within the city continues to increase than what appeared to be an absolute projection is in-fact an 
intensity projection and emissions will continue to increase.  
Challenges to interpreting and comparing the projected impacts continue as Chicago reports the 
potential of a reduction in consumption between 13-23%. This range takes into account two scenarios. 
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In the first, all buildings achieve an EUI equivalent to the 50th percentile. The second scenario, where all 
buildings achieve an EUI equivalent to the 75th percentile. There does not appear to be any timeline or 
path for arriving at one scenario or the other, but rather the impacts appear to be an identification of 
possible statistical outcomes as opposed to projections of an expected outcome.  
New York’s projected GHG emission reductions stand out for its sheer size at over 2.7 million tonnes by 
2030. Chicago’s projections remain opaque because of the aforementioned planning approach used, but 
the City identifies possible savings of between 460,000 and 844,000 tonnes. San Francisco’s target is 
perhaps the most interesting as it is a five-year target set in 2010 of 64,000 tonnes reduced by 2015. 
Data has not yet been released for 2015 but when it does, it will provide an early measure of the success 
of benchmarking at lowering greenhouse gas emissions.  
Information on the costs and benefits to the municipal corporation enacting the policies was even more 
sparse and difficult to compare (see Table 16). With the exception of Austin and Seattle, there was very 
little discussion on the costs of the program to the city—including in the design documentation, 
enacting ordinance, and annual reports. 
Table 167. Cost and Benefit Analysis 
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Operational Costs to the City No No No No No No Yes 
No 
(86%) 
Deferred Costs to the City Yes No No No No No No 
No 
(86%) 
Projected Impacts of Policy Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Yes 
(71%) 
 Seattle’s ordinance is unique in that it includes an appended fiscal note which estimates year 1 costs to 
be $240,000 (staff and consultants) and year 2 costs to be $180,000 (staff and compliance). The fiscal 
note estimates revenues in year 1 of $153,000 and year 2 of $178,000 from enforcement fines (City of 
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Seattle, 2009). It is not clear whether these estimates include only new staffing costs, or if it allocates 
funds to cover overhead costs of supporting departments.  
Austin does not directly address program costs but instead takes a look at the deferred costs to the 
utility of continual energy consumption growth. The Northeast Energy Efficiency Partnerships reports 
that “Austin Energy is the eighth largest city-owned utility in the US, and upon passing the [ordinance] 
Austin Energy was given the role of administrated the [benchmarking] policy, reporting results and 
ensuring compliance” (Northeast Energy Efficiency Partnerships, 2013, p. 44). The benefit to Austin 
Energy then, is not enforcement fines, but rather the significant cost savings of differed generating 
capacity investments. Austin’s Energy Efficiency Upgrades Task Force predicts that by 2020 the demand 
from customers will be greater than supply by 238 megawatts, and that the cheapest new generating 
capacity it could construct—a gas power plant—would require an expenditure of $706,000 per 
megawatt for a total of $168 million. However, this cost would quickly grow with a new nuclear plant to 
meet the 238 megawatt demand, costing $590 million. (Energy Efficiency Upgrades Task Force - City of 
Austin, 2008). 
The stated policy objectives of the jurisdictions are diverse and often vague, and yet they set an 
important foundation for the shaping of the policies themselves. It will be shown in Chapter 6 that the 
stated policy objectives are correlated with the design decisions. This is a logical conclusion as policy-
makers first set the overarching goals of a policy before considering the best approach for attaining 
these goals. For example, if reflexive-accountability and education-through-transparency are primary 
objectives for a policy (ex. improve building owner decision-making) it could be reasonable to forego 
public disclosure on an interactive website, and instead only require disclosure to the government and 
certain key stakeholders. For this reason, it is important that the selection and recording of policy 
objectives should be carefully considered. The following section will explore the processes used by 
jurisdictions for adoption of the policies, processes which include the selection of the stated policy 
objectives. 
5.3 – Adoption Process 
Formal stakeholder engagement is an important consideration for jurisdictions as it contributes to the 
formation of both the stated policy objectives and the design of a policy. Austin, Boston, and San 
Francisco (43%) disclosed at least some details about the process by which they created the 
benchmarking policy or which voices were given a seat at the table (see Table 7). In the three cities 
where a formal stakeholder working group process to guide the creation of energy benchmarking 
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policies was disclosed, the group was established either as a standalone committee tasked with 
exploring benchmarking specifically (Austin and San Francisco) or as part of an existing climate strategy 
working group (Boston) (Mayor's Task Force on Existing Buildings; City of Boston, n.d.).  
Table 17. Stakeholder Engagement 
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Standalone 
Working 
Group 
Yes No No No No Yes No No 
(71%) 
Climate 
Strategy 
Working 
Group 
No Yes No No No Yes No No 
(71%) 
For example, Austin’s council directed “the City Manager to create a Task Force to identify and 
recommend City Code revisions to implement cost effective energy efficiency retrofits and upgrades of 
Austin [buildings]” (Energy Efficiency Upgrades Task Force - City of Austin, 2008, p. 5). San Francisco 
convened its Existing Commercial Building Task Force “to recommend policies, actions, and partnerships 
that will meet local and state goals to improve energy efficiency in buildings in order to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, conserve resources, enhance electricity reliability, and improve the 
competitiveness of commercial buildings in the City” (Mayor's Task Force on Existing Buildings, p. ii). 
The composition of these task forces (see Table 18 for a summary and Appendix B – Task Force 
Composition for a complete listing) varied from city to city but was largely comprised of real estate and 
financial professionals, contractors, and advocates. 
Table 18. Task Force Composition 
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Civil Society / 
Cause 
5 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Engineering / 
Contractors / 
Industry 
4 0 0 0 0 9 0 
Finance 4 3 0 0 0 2 0 
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Real Estate / 
Property 
Management 
10 7 0 0 0 5 0 
Municipal / 
Regulator 
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Utility 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Total 28 11 0 0 0 17 0 
The importance of the task force composition is evident in the voting record published by Austin. The 
Austin policy included voluntary participation in targets for performance improvement by buildings 
covered by the benchmarking policy. Task force members were asked to consider whether these goals 
should be applied mandatorily if not met through voluntary participation. Four task force members 
voted in favour of mandatory targets and 17 voted against mandatory targets. The arguments highlight 
the challenges in climate change mitigation work more broadly:  
 In Favour of Mandatory Targets: Those in favour argued that (1) “voluntary targets would have 
little or no practical effect if there was no foreseeable risk that mandatory measures would be 
implemented”; (2) the time cost of waiting for action was too high and that mandatory 
requirements were required to drive action; and, (3) that mandatory targets were required to 
incentivize landlords who otherwise have less incentive to improve efficiency and reduce bills of 
tenants (Energy Efficiency Upgrades Task Force - City of Austin, 2008, p. 3).  
 Opposed to Mandatory Targets: This argument can be subdivided into (1) the market should be 
given a chance to internalize the new information before changes are mandated and that any 
mandatory policies should be based up data collected through the policy; (2) energy price 
increases should be relied upon instead of regulation; and, (3) a general opposition to any 
mandatory requirements (Energy Efficiency Upgrades Task Force - City of Austin, 2008). 
The 4-17 voting equates to 19% of task force members voting in favour of more stringent policy. While 
the individual votes of the task force members are not recorded, this roughly corresponds with the 
percentage of ‘Civil Society / Cause’ task force members of 18%. While this is by no means conclusive, it 
does suggest that composition of a task force should not be overlooked. 
The trend of not making use of a standalone working group or climate strategy working group could be a 
lost opportunity for jurisdictions. While no assessments were found of whether stakeholder 
engagement increases the utility of a given benchmarking policy, the literature provides some insights 
and will be explored later in this thesis.  
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5.4 - Coverage & Implementation Schedule  
The size and types of commercial buildings which are to be covered by the regulation and required to 
report are different in each jurisdiction. The Northeast Energy Partnership (2013) advises that it is 
important for cities to construct energy benchmarking policies with a firm knowledge of the local 
building stock. It uses the examples of Austin and New York to demonstrate this need. Austin’s building 
stock is dominated by medium-density buildings, whereas New York has a greater proportion of high-
density buildings. For example, in New York, “large buildings of over 50,000 sq-ft comprise just 2 percent 
of the total building stock, but these buildings consume over 45 percent of the energy consumed by all 
buildings in the city” (Northeast Energy Efficiency Partnerships, 2013, p. 18). With this in-mind, New 
York built a benchmarking program to focus on this 2% of the building stock in order to lower costs to 
the city and maximize the return.  
A challenge in selecting the size and usage requirements for covered buildings is the lack of complete 
local building data. Seattle developed its database of buildings using ownership, location, age of 
building, and floor area data from the local property assessor. To improve the dataset, private databases 
from real estate market research firms like CoStar were leveraged, as well as direct outreach to the 
building owners. The first reporting period required extra staff attention in order to update and make 
corrections to the database using the reported data (Seattle Office of Sustainability & Environment, 
2014). 
Table 19 lists the year that a building size is required to report. Five (71%) of the jurisdictions require 
reporting from government buildings, with New York and Boston (29%) mandating disclosure from 
government facilities before private buildings. Jurisdictions which do not require government reporting, 
all use a phased-in implementation schedule which begins with the largest buildings before moving to 
smaller buildings (see Table 20 for a summary). 
Table 89. Implementation Schedule 
The symbol (g) represents a government building reporting requirement. The numbers represent the square 
footage requirement for reporting, where all buildings at or above that size are required to report. Adapted from 
the Institute for Market Transformation’s policy comparison tool (Institute for Market Transformation, n.d.). 
Jurisdiction 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Austin   75,000 30,000 10,000   
Boston    All (g) 50,000  35,000 
Chicago     250,000  
250,000 (g) 
50,000 
50,000 (g) 
 
New York 10,000 (g) 50,000      
Philadelphia    50,000    
63 
 
50,000 (g) 
San Francisco   50,000 25,000 10,000    
Seattle   50,000 
50,000 (g) 
20,000 
20,000 (g) 
   
This approach allows for institutional learning and capacity building with a smaller number of reporting 
organizations. Similar to a pilot program, the jurisdiction can have a greater number of staff hours to 
work with a smaller number of organizations as during early implementation there is a greater likelihood 
of challenges with systems and training, and less standardization. Focusing on large buildings is also 
advantageous because they are more likely to have in-house energy or sustainability expertise who 
require less support to meet the requirements of the policy. Finally, the supporting industry of 
consultants and engineers also needs time to build up its own capacity to meet increased demand. 
Philadelphia is unique in that it requires government disclosure and commercial disclosure in the same 
year. No explanation was found as to why this approach was selected by Philadelphia. A more detailed 
description of how jurisdictions define the size of buildings covered by benchmarking policies is provided 
in Appendix C – Definition of Buildings Covered by Benchmarking Policy. 
Table 20. Implementation Approach 
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Government 
Reporting 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
(71%) 
Phased-In 
Reporting 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes  
(86%) 
As new buildings begin to report data in the early years of a benchmarking policy, the result may 
become skewed. Figure 5 shows the changing EUI by property type for San Francisco over a four-year 
period as new buildings began to report. Although median EUI decreased for office buildings between 
2011 to 2014, the results for hotel, retail, and warehouse properties are less linear. This change could be 
the result of less efficient buildings being required to report, genuine differences in the building stock 
between large and small buildings, and lack of energy knowledge on the part of owners of smaller 
buildings (SFEnvironment, n.d.). A longer time series is required to arrive at an answer.  
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Figure 5. Median EUI by Property Type in San Francisco (2010-2014) 
 
(SFEnvironment, n.d.) 
The selection of covered buildings goes beyond the square footage. A commercial building can be used 
for many different purposes and by many different occupants. Table 21 shows that six (86%) of the 
jurisdictions include exemptions or variances for certain types of buildings in a variety of situations 
including (1) financial distress, (2) upcoming demolishment or substantial remodelling, (3) occupancy 
less than 50 percent, and (4) exhaustion of available upgrades (see Table 9) (Energy Efficiency Upgrades 
Task Force - City of Austin, 2008; City of Chicago, 2013; Seattle Office of Sustainability & Environment, 
2014; Institute for Market Transformation, n.d.). Features of the building not directly related to the 
occupancy are also often excluded, including cellular towers and electric vehicle charging stations (City 
of Chicago, 2013). Although exemptions and variances are a standard practice across the jurisdictions, 
the specific exemptions mentioned above are not uniformly applied across the jurisdictions.  
Table 91. Coverage Exemptions 
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Exemptions Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
(86%) 
The coverage and implementation schedules of the jurisdictions show a measured approach of 
demonstrating government leadership, providing time for capacity building and learning with a smaller 
number of disclosers, and exempting building types that are anomalous. In Chapter 6, the coverage and 
exemptions will be unpacked further by drawing upon lessons from the literature about policy 
sustainability and stakeholder pressures.  
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5.5 – Disclosure Requirements 
Table 22 lists the audience and trigger for disclosure. The jurisdictions can be categorized as employing 
either a point of transaction trigger or a scheduled date trigger for disclosure.  
Table 102. Disclosure Requirements 
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Public 
Disclosure 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
(71%) 
Scheduled 
Disclosure 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
(71%) 
Triggered 
Disclosure 
Yes No No No No No Yes No 
(71%) 
The majority of jurisdictions (71%) require annual disclosure on a set date, and disclose the data on a 
public website. This public disclosure is written directly into the ordinance or law, with a statement 
requiring municipal benchmarking officials to make the information publicly available (SF Environment, 
City & County of San Francisco, 2014). Boston’s ordinance defines the medium of disclosure as the City 
of Boston website, the time of disclosure as “no later than October first of each year,” and the content 
to be disclosed as including at least “building identification, energy intensity, greenhouse gas emissions 
per square foot, Energy Star rating, [and] water consumption per square foot” (City of Boston, 2013, p. 
6). Boston’s ordinance is unique in that it directs the benchmarking department to provide at least 30 
days for buildings owners to “review the accuracy of information to be disclosed” prior to disclosure, 
and that building owners shall be allowed to provide context to the energy and water usage of their 
buildings which should be disclosed along with the data (City of Boston, 2013, p. 6). 
The City of Chicago is less specific in its ordinance, permitting the benchmarking department to “choose 
to make specific reported benchmarking information available to the public through the City of Chicago 
Energy Benchmarking Website, the City of Chicago Data Portal, or other communication vehicles. (City 
of Chicago - Department of Business Affairs and Consumer Protection, 2014). Where Chicago is specific 
though, is through an exemption for buildings containing “a data center, television studio, or trading 
floor that together exceed ten percent of the gross square footage” (City of Chicago, 2013, p. 4). This 
exemption is put in place to prevent building-wide data from being skewed by a heavy consumer, and to 
protect trade secrets of a technology firm which could be revealed through energy data (City of Chicago, 
2013). 
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Austin and Seattle both take a point of transaction trigger approach wherein disclosure is required when 
a commercial building is available for purchase or lease. It is important to note that the audiences for 
disclosure in both cases—Austin and Seattle—of a point of transaction trigger are prospective buyers 
and tenants, and not the public-at-large. Mattern (2013) has attributed Austin’s decision not to disclose 
information to the wider public as motivated by Texas privacy policies which protect consumption and 
credit data. The challenge of privacy laws extends beyond Texas. Mattern provides an example of a 1997 
ruling by the Washington Supreme Court which “found that the state’s constitutional guarantee that ‘no 
person shall be disturbed in his private affairs’ extended to residential electricity consumption 
information’” (p. 507). While Washington is not a case study included in this study, it is noteworthy 
because it suggests that the Texas experience could be widespread across the country, and a relevant 
consideration for jurisdictions considering a benchmarking policy.  
There are no instances of a policy which uses triggered disclosure and publicly discloses the data. This is 
logical as the trigger is a commercial transaction which involves a closed group of actors. Disclosure 
requirements are closely linked to the discussion in the following section—intended audience—as the 
requirements shape the type of information available and who has access.  
5.6 – Audience 
57% of the jurisdictions provide an interactive graphical display of the data (see Table 113 for a list of 
cities’ approach to disclosure of public data). This number increases to 80% when Austin and Seattle—
the two jurisdictions without public data disclosure—are removed. Of the jurisdictions with public 
disclosure only San Francisco does not have an interactive graphical display. No information was found 
which suggests why San Francisco does not have an interactive graphical display.   
Table 113. Approach to Disclosure of Data 
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Graphical 
Display 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes 
(57%) 
Numerical 
Display 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
(71%) 
Annual 
Report 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(100%) 
Civil Society 
Enabling 
No No No No No No No No 
(100%) 
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An example of an interactive graphical display is that of Philadelphia which hired a local technology firm 
to develop “an easy-to-use data visualization tool which will allow building owners, tenants, and service 
providers easy access to this information” in an effort to move “beyond the public disclosure of a 
difficult-to-navigate spreadsheet toward a tool specifically designed to compare results and call out [the] 
most efficient buildings” (City of Philadelphia, 2014, p. 22). Figure 6 and Figure 7 show screenshots of 
the data tool used by Philadelphia with the former showing the data using the map setting, and the 
latter in the chart setting. Each dot represents a reporting building, with colours delineating between 
building type, and size of dot indicating the EUI of the building.  As opposed to an Excel spreadsheet, the 
graphical interface allows a prospective tenant or purchaser to easily compare buildings within a certain 
type and geographical location. These same features are common across the jurisdictions with an 
interactive graphical display, although each jurisdiction uses a different platform with different user 
interfaces.  
Figure 6. Philadelphia Data Visualization in Map Setting 
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Figure 7. Philadelphia Data Visualization in Graph Setting 
 
 
Cities also take varying approaches to reporting on results of benchmarking to council and the public. 
Chicago’s ordinance requires staff to “prepare and submit an annual report to the mayor and the city 
council reviewing and evaluating energy efficiency in covered buildings, including summary statistics on 
the most recent reported energy benchmarking information and a discussion of energy efficiency trends, 
cost savings, and job creation effects results from energy efficiency improvements” (City of Chicago, 2013, 
p. 4). Staff are permitted to publish the report but are instructed not to report any data that could identify 
a specific building during its first year of reporting (City of Chicago, 2013).  
 
Philadelphia instructs its staff to annually submit a report to council which addresses “(a) the energy and 
water efficiency of buildings in the City, (b) the accuracy of benchmarked data and whether there is a 
need to train individuals required to benchmark, (c) compliance with the requirements of this Section, (d) 
any administrative and legislative recommendations for strengthening the administration and 
enforcement of this Section, (e) the effectiveness of the Benchmarking Application in accounting for City 
conditions, including, but not limited to, high density occupancies, large building size, and high-energy 
uses such as data centers and television studios, and (f) such other information and analysis as the Office 
of Sustainability deems appropriate” (City of Philadelphia, 2012, p. 5). 
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No information was found which suggests that the jurisdictions actively encourage and support civil 
society advocates in understanding, analyzing, and using the data to pressure disclosers into modifying 
behaviour.  
5.7 – Data Submission 
Despite the lack of apparent reported evidence, the belief among benchmarking cities appears to be 
strongly held that automated data uploading is an important component as “direct data upload between 
the utility and Portfolio Manager minimizes data entry errors, missing data and ensures consistency with 
utility records” (Seattle Office of Sustainability & Environment, 2014, p. 54). In its 2014 report, Austin—
the oldest benchmarking policy in the sample—noted a need to “simplify the data submittal process and 
tool” (Austin Energy - City of Austin, 2014, p. 8). Newer policies have tended to build data uploading 
automation directly into the enacting policy. In Boston, “building owners may authorize an energy or 
water utility or other third party to report building-specific data on their behalf” (City of Boston, 2013, p. 
4). Table 1224 shows that 86% of cities allow for some degree of automated data submission. For 
example, while Philadelphia similarly allows an owner to arrange for their utility or energy supplier to 
submit the required data, the policy is clear that utilities and energy suppliers are not required to 
provide this service (City of Philadelphia, 2012). Most cities do not report the rate at which buildings use 
automated data uploading, however, Seattle’s reports that in 2014, 78% of buildings use automated 
reporting for electricity consumption (Seattle Office of Sustainability & Environment, 2014).  
Table 124. Automated Data Submission 
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Automatic Data 
Uploading 
Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(86%) 
As technology continues to evolve—including the introduction of the internet-of-things into building 
operations—it can be expected that the degree of automation of data submission will continue to 
improve and allow new opportunities for providing data that is updated more frequently, has greater 
depth, and eases the reporting process for building owners.  
5.8 - Compliance 
Disclosure policies require high rates of compliance in order to be effective (Northeast Energy Efficiency 
Partnerships, 2013). Without high compliance, a city is unable to generate a “robust, long-term dataset 
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that is representative of [its] building stock” which diminishes the informational value for decision-
makers (Seattle Office of Sustainability & Environment, 2014, p. 43).  
Compliance rates are difficult to directly compare across cities because of the dramatic differences in 
scale and building stock. For example, Seattle led the nation in 2014 with a compliance rate of 93%. In 
comparison, New York achieved a compliance rate of 84% during the same year. However, Seattle’s 
dataset included nearly 3,000 covered buildings, while New York received reports from over 23,400 
buildings (Seattle Office of Sustainability & Environment, 2014; New York City, 2014). In general, though, 
benchmarking programs report rates of compliance between 75% and 90% (City of Philadelphia, 2014). 
While cities with the highest rates of compliances anecdotally credit their success to a variety of 
factors—including automated data uploading—no analysis or surveys were published by the cities to 
test which factors led to high rates of compliance.  
In situations where compliance is not achieved, all seven cities have a provision in the policy which 
enables penalties to be levied against the building owner in order to encourage corrective behaviour 
(see Table 25 for a categorization of penalties). Austin is alone in only having a one-time charge of 
$500—although a larger fine of $2,000 can be imposed if criminal negligence is shown. In all other cases, 
the cities use an on-going charge which continues to penalize building owners for each period of non-
compliance. A period of non-compliance is defined differently by the jurisdictions as being either a day 
or quarter during which the building owner remains non-compliant. These on-going charges typically 
accumulate to a maximum range of somewhere between $2,000 and $4,000 per year.  
Table 135. Compliance 
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One-Time 
Charge 
Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes 
(57%) 
Increasing 
Charge 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(86%) 
Building 
Engagement 
& Support 
Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(86%) 
Data 
Verification 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(100%) 
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To engage building owners, Austin conducted a series of letter writing campaigns including thank you 
letters upon submission and non-compliance letters (Austin Energy - City of Austin, 2014).  
Philadelphia issued “individual report cards to each of the more than 1,900 buildings that [complied]. 
These report cards [included] a full explanation of individual results along with local and national 
comparison and details on local inventive programs to improve energy performance” (City of 
Philadelphia, 2014). Seattle aims to maintain outreach on an ongoing basis in recognition that buildings 
change owners every 2-5 years. By maintaining engagement, Seattle can ensure that its contact 
database is up to date, and that new building owners are aware of both the benchmarking program and 
related incentives (Seattle Office of Sustainability & Environment, 2014). Chicago, Seattle, and 
Philadelphia all offer help desks which field phone calls, with peak usage occurring during reporting 
periods (Seattle Office of Sustainability & Environment, 2014; City of Chicago, 2014; City of Chicago's 
Office of the Mayor, 2013; City of Philadelphia, 2014).  
Beyond outreach to ensure basic compliance, training workshops were used to support building owners 
and managers understand what benchmarking means for their business.  Both Austin and Chicago 
hosted free workshops and posted training videos online (Austin Energy - City of Austin, 2014; City of 
Chicago's Office of the Mayor, 2013). Seattle states that “the energy benchmarking program should be 
positioned as a ‘bridge’ to help building owners and managers understand and act on their building’s 
energy performance data” (Seattle Office of Sustainability & Environment, 2014, p. 44). Training and 
workshops are seen as the means by which to support building owners and managers in understanding 
their data and identifying steps for action (Seattle Office of Sustainability & Environment, 2014).  
New York found that through a combination of update letter and calls, training sessions and workshops, 
and a help line, it was able to increase compliance. In the first year that New York operated its 
benchmarking policy it attained compliance of 75%. This compliance rate is low compared to the high 
compliance rates of Seattle identified in the previous section. However, New York argues that the high 
percentage of large facilities that makes up its building stock diminished the utility of penalties at driving 
compliance as the fees charged are relatively inconsequential. Instead, outreach, training and support 
was responsible for attaining compliance (Northeast Energy Efficiency Partnerships, 2013). 
Data quality must always be verified regardless of the mode of submission (Northeast Energy Efficiency 
Partnerships, 2013).  For example, Seattle reports that during its first two years of reporting, 5% of 
covered buildings reported either an increase or decrease in energy consumption of at least 50% 
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(Seattle Office of Sustainability & Environment, 2014). Significant changes in reported energy 
consumption could certainly be the result of reporting errors (see Figure 8 for adapted excerpt of Seattle 
document outlining sources of data inaccuracies), but can also be the result of real increases or 
decreases in energy consumption, or changes in occupancy (Seattle Office of Sustainability & 
Environment, 2014). 
Figure 8. Potential sources of data inaccuracies 
1. Inclusion of all meters not verified. Buildings using utility automated benchmarking for 
aggregating multiple tenant meters into one upload could be missing electric, steam or gas 
meters if the meters were not correctly verified by the owner or manager.  
2. Use of unverified property square footage. Although the data accuracy assessment determined 
that the use of King County square footage does not appear to substantially bias results, building 
owners could increase accuracy by calculating square footage based on building plans or actual 
measurements. 
3. Data centers, cell phone towers and electric vehicle charging stations. These three loads may 
substantially affect a building’s energy use if they are not separately metered. Portfolio Manager 
requires building owners to separately document data centers. It is possible that the 44 out of 
429 offices (10%) recording a data center space represents an underreporting of data centers. Cell 
phone towers and electric vehicle charging stations are not documented in Portfolio Manager, 
and could be included in building EUIs if not separately metered and excluded. 
4. Outliers. The data cleaning process conservatively removed only the top and bottom 1% of EUIs in 
the entire dataset, leaving some unlikely values in the dataset that could represent benchmarking 
errors. Additionally, the assessment found some variability in EUI for buildings with two years of 
data, with 5% of buildings reporting a change in EUI of 50% or greater. These cases along with 
extreme values could be reviewed on a case by case basis by technical assistance staff to identify 
and resolve any issues. It is also likely that reporting practices will improve over time, resulting in 
fewer outliers. 
5. Building occupancy not frequently updated. In the statistical sample (n=75), 15% of commercial 
buildings 50,000 square feet or larger updated occupancy information between 2011 and 2012.  
Adapted from Seattle Office of Sustainability & Environment (2014). 2011/2012 Seattle Building 
Energy Benchmarking Analysis Report. p. 19-20. 
The strength of the identified compliance trends suggests that jurisdictions are taking compliance 
seriously. A key test of the sustainability of benchmarking policies will be the continued increase of 
compliance and ensuring meaningful penalties for non-compliance as disclosers and those who are 
disadvantaged by the policy—whether actual or perceived—push back. Further time series data is 
required for this analysis. 
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5.9 – Adaptation 
Amendments made to benchmarking policies after initial implementation range from simple 
implementation changes to significant expansions of reporting and retrofit requirements. An example of 
a simple implementation amendment is Boston’s decision to grant an additional 120 days in the first 
year for data submission in response to feedback from building owners who asked for more “time to 
familiarize themselves with the ordinance” (City of Boston, 2014).  
The three types of amendments (see Table 1426) which create significant expansions are the mandated 
reporting of water consumption (57%), audits (57%), and retro-commissioning (29%).  
Table 146. Amendments to Benchmarking Ordinances 
Adapted from Institute for Market Transformation (n.d.) 
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Audits Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
(57%) 
Water Use No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
(57%) 
Retro-
Commissioning 
No No No Yes No No Yes No 
(71%) 
Audit requirements can be understood by looking at the examples of San Francisco and Boston which 
respectively represent the two primary approaches of (1) requiring an audit, and (2) requiring an audit 
with a corresponding action. San Francisco requires an energy audit—which meets or exceeds American 
Society of Heating, Refrigeration, and Air-Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE) standards—every five years 
to identify “specific cost-effective measures that would save energy” (SF Environment, City & County of 
San Francisco, 2014, p. 1). San Francisco staggered audit due dates over a period of three years in order 
to allow the consulting industry time to meet quickly growing demand (SF Environment, City & County 
of San Francisco, 2014). 
Boston goes one step further in requiring that a covered building complete either an energy audit or 
“action” within “five years of its first energy reporting deadline and within every five-year period 
thereafter” (City of Boston, 2013, p. 4). An action can include (1) a reduction of EUI by at least 15%, (2) 
an improvement in ENERGY STAR rating by at least 15 points, and (3) installation of renewable energy 
onsite that increases its available renewable energy supply by at least 15% of energy consumption (Air 
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Pollution Control Commission - City of Boston). Buildings with an ENERGY STAR performance rating, 
LEED designation, or a “comprehensive management plans” are exempted from the assessment or 
action requirement (City of Boston, 2013, p. 4).   
Water reporting requirements are an extension of existing energy benchmarking requirements and the 
data is submitted through Portfolio Manager. In the case of Boston and Philadelphia, water reporting 
was included in the original ordinance requiring energy reporting, and reporting timelines and penalties 
are consistent for energy and water (City of Philadelphia Department of Licenses and Inspections; City of 
Boston, 2013). While New York also mandated the disclosure of water in its initial law creating 
benchmarking, it added the exemption that "benchmarking of water use shall not be required unless the 
building [is] equipped with automatic meter reading equipment by the department of environmental 
protection" (The City of New York, 2009, p. 3-4). This exemption was temporary and connected with a 
city-wide program to install automatic meter reading equipment.  
Retro-commissioning, while less common than water reporting and audit requirements, is attractive 
because it is viewed as a low-cost measure capable of reducing a building’s energy consumption 
between 5-15% by optimizing the operation of existing systems (Jump, Denny, & Abesamis, 2007, p. 1). 
New York requires retro-commissioning reports from covered buildings every ten years, with buildings 
staggered over the decade to spread the demand for consultants performing the retro-commissioning. 
Retro-commissioning requirements apply to HVAC systems, large equipment, lighting, and water pumps. 
Covered buildings are required to review operating protocols and system calibration, clean and repair 
systems, and ensure maintenance and operations staff are properly trained (City of New York, 2009). 
5.10 – Question #2: Which policy components do jurisdictions select and are there apparent trends? 
The second question that this thesis seeks to address is:  
Question #2: Which policy components do jurisdictions select and are there apparent trends? 
Table 27 summarizes the policy components and trends that were identified in Chapter 5’s review of 
active benchmarking policies. As defined in 2.5 - Research Method, this thesis defines a trend as a policy 
component adopted by a majority of jurisdictions.  
Cities are encouraged to adopt benchmarking policies by the successful implementation of 
benchmarking in other jurisdictions, and by the climate and energy goals of senior levels of government. 
Reducing GHG emissions is the primary policy objective for a city to adopt a benchmarking policy. The 
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policies are designed through the use of either a standalone committee purposefully assembled to 
create a benchmarking policy, or by previously established climate strategy working groups. These 
committees tend to include real estate professionals, contractors, and advocates.  
Policies are designed to maximize the floor area impacted while minimizing the number of buildings 
required to report. Finding the right threshold for coverage and assembling the proper information for 
reaching out to owners is a challenge due to a lack of available data. To form an initial understanding of 
the building stock, cities use a combination of local property assessor data and private databases from 
real estate market research firms such as CoStar. It can be expected that the first year of 
implementation will require additional reach outs and engagement in order to update the databases. 
Phased-in reporting is used to allow for capacity building, beginning with the largest buildings covered 
by the policy as well as government buildings. 
Data is reported publicly using a graphical interface at a regularly schedule date which coincides with an 
annual report summarizing results and lessons learned. This format and schedule increases the utility of 
the data for decision makers, advocates, and planners. 
Jurisdictions partner with local utilities to provide automatic data uploading in order to minimize data 
errors, however, verification is still required in order to ensure data quality. Penalties which increase to 
a capped amount are imposed for non-compliance. 
Jurisdictions partner with local utilities to provide automatic data uploading in order to minimize data 
errors, however, verification is still required in order to ensure data quality. Penalties which increase to 
a capped amount are imposed for non-compliance. In addition to the threat of penalties, training and 
support services in the form of letter writing campaigns, workshops, and seminars were useful for 
compliance. These additional supports are best customized to meet the requirements of building 
owners depending on their level of knowledge and the particular needs of their building type.  
In order to expand the impact of benchmarking policies, amendments or additional requirements are 
included to mandate reporting of water consumption and audits.  
Table 157. Trends in Active Jurisdiction Policy Component Selection 
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Stated Policy Objectives 
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Energy & 
Environment 
GHG Reduction No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
(71%) 
Energy Efficiency or 
Conservation 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes 
(57%) 
Climatic Change No Yes No No No Yes No No 
(71%) 
Avoided New Supply Yes No No No No No No No 
(86%) 
Economic Cost Savings for Ratepayers Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes 
(57%) 
Spur Green Economy No Yes No No No No No No 
(86%) 
Political, Policy 
and Planning 
Meet Targets in Climate or 
Energy Plan 
Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes 
(57%) 
Bring Existing Buildings up to 
New Building Code 
Yes No No Yes No Yes No No 
(57%) 
Improve Data for Better Urban 
Planning 
No No No No Yes Yes Yes No 
(57%) 
Senior Level of Government 
Directive or Leadership 
No No No No No Yes No No 
(86%) 
Human & Health Reduced Pollution No Yes No No No No No No 
(86%) 
Occupancy Enjoyment No Yes No No No No No No 
(86%) 
Other Increase Transparency No No Yes Yes No No Yes No 
(57%) 
Improve Building Owner 
Decision Making 
No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(57%) 
Demonstrated Feasibility No Yes No No No No No No 
(86%) 
Operational Costs to the City No No No No No No Yes No 
(86%) 
Deferred Costs to the City Yes No No No No No No No 
(86%) 
Projected Impacts of the Policy Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
(71%) 
Adoption Process 
Use of ENERGY STAR Resources and Technology Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(100%) 
Standalone Working Group Yes No No No No Yes No No 
(71%) 
Climate Strategy Working Group No Yes No No No Yes No No 
(71%) 
Coverage & Implementation Schedule 
Government Reporting No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
(71%) 
Phased-In Reporting Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
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(86%) 
Scoping Requirements Limiting Reporting by 
Building Size and Type 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(100%) 
Exemptions Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
(86%) 
Disclosure Requirements 
Public Disclosure No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
(71%) 
Scheduled Disclosure No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
(71%) 
Triggered Disclosure Yes No No No No No Yes No 
(71%) 
Audience 
Numerical Display No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
(71%) 
Graphical Display No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes 
(57%) 
Annual Report Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(100%) 
Civil Society Enabling No No No No No No No No 
(100%) 
Data Submission 
Automatic Uploading Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(86%) 
Compliance 
One-Time Charge Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes 
(57%) 
Increasing Charge No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(86%) 
Building Engagement & Support Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(86%) 
Data Verification Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(100%) 
Adaptation 
Audits Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
(57%) 
Water Use No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
(57%) 
Retro-Commissioning No No No Yes No No Yes No 
(71%) 
The trends suggest two main delineations or approaches that jurisdictions take: 
 Open Disclosure: Requires disclosure annually (scheduled disclosure). Data is released publicly 
and is available on an interactive website which accommodates the needs and level of expertise 
of the data consumer.  
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 Closed Disclosure: Requires disclosure upon sale, lease or financing of the building (triggered 
disclosure). Data is released only to the parties involved in the financial transaction. 
There appears to be a general consensus among advocates, the EPA, and policy-makers that open 
disclosure is preferable, and no argument was found in favour of closed disclosure—even by the 
jurisdictions that employ it. Rather, closed disclosure is an approach used by jurisdictions because of 
privacy legislation and stakeholder pressure at the time of implementation (Mattern, 2013). With the 
exception of some minor differences in the stated policy objectives (closed disclosure jurisdictions 
record policy objectives that are less focused on the climate, and more focused on issues such as 
transparency and ratepayer costs), there are few discernable design differences between open and 
closed disclosure policies.  
The only policy component with a notable division in policy design is that of adaptation. A greater 
degree of differences in this component is logical as it extends benchmarking beyond its original 
purpose of information disclosure, and instead mandates an action or additional type of disclosure. This 
policy component will likely see the most experimentation and variability over the coming years as 
jurisdictions try different approaches to meet their policy objectives. The remaining policy components 
have strong alignment across the jurisdictions. 
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Chapter 6 – Results and Conclusions 
6.1 – Chapter Overview 
This chapter represents the bulk of the analysis of the thesis, comparing the active jurisdictions against 
the theoretical expectations, and then exploring the gap between the two in order to both contribute to 
theory and provide new insights for practitioners. This chapter begins with Question #3 which asks how 
the selection of policy components in active jurisdictions compares against theoretical expectations. In 
this section, a table is presented which highlights where there is alignment and where there is a gap. The 
conversation here is applied and focuses on the data at hand. Next, Question #4 circles back to broader 
debates within new governance and targeted information disclosure literature. This thesis concludes by 
with recommendations for future research. 
6.2 - Question #3: How does the selection of policy components in active jurisdictions compare against 
theoretical expectations? 
The third question that this thesis seeks to address is: 
Question #3: How does the selection of policy components in active jurisdictions compare 
against theoretical expectations? 
Table 28 compares the trend identified for each policy component against the theoretical expectations. 
The three final columns in the table show where there is “Alignment of Theory & Practice”, “Theory 
Unmet by Practice” and “Undescribed Practice.”  
It is found that theory accurately describes policy decisions such as: 
 The policy objectives of seeking to improve a specific and measurable environmental metric and 
to generate new information to support polluters in improving behaviour 
 The use of the federally produced ENERGY STAR methodology and Portfolio Manager platform 
in order to reduce time and financial costs 
 The need to focus on large emitters and phase in coverage over time 
 Requiring public and scheduled disclosure, with information customized and targeted towards 
specific types of data consumers 
This alignment of theory and practice is logical because they speak to the core elements of targeted 
information disclosure as a tool for generating new information to drive a behaviour change through 
principle-agent and reflexive accountability. This alignment confirms that energy benchmarking can be 
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appropriately described as a targeted information disclosure policy, and that policy makers are adhering 
to the core elements of information disclosure theory.  
Where there is a gap between theory and practice, however, is mainly on matters of policy objectives 
and process:  
 Policy Objectives: Theory anticipates policies which seek to achieve the objectives of generating 
new information to correct for improper discount rates and principle-agent problems, to 
overcome weaknesses of command-and-control policies in managing the complexity of building 
energy systems, and to improve the level of information for policy makers. While these 
objectives may have been considered privately, they were not captured in the enacting or 
design documents of the majority of jurisdictions. Only two of the seven jurisdictions shared 
information on the process they used to create the policies, and even in these instances the 
information is rather sparse, so it is difficult to know which policy objectives were considered 
and why certain ones made it into the enacting documents while others did not. The author’s 
hypothesis is that policy makers communicated the policy objectives for the target audience of 
elected officials and the general public. Messages of greenhouse gas emission mitigation, 
reduced costs for ratepayers, and more efficient markets were likely considered to be more 
attractive than identifying weaknesses of command-and-control policies or challenges with 
discount rates. While there are significant differences between the stated policy objectives, 
there is little evidence at this point to suggest that these differences influenced design decisions 
for other policy components.  
 Process: Theory describes the need to engage stakeholders early and meaningfully in the 
adoption process in order to ensure that the data which is produced can be incorporated into 
existing decision processes, and to reduce counter-pressures once the policy is enacted. Civil 
society should continue to be engaged once implemented to increase compliance, conduct 
training to allow for reflective accountability, leverage public pressure to encourage improved 
energy performance by disclosers, and increase legitimacy through broad stakeholder 
engagement. Additionally, both during the design process and into implementation, jurisdictions 
should solicit feedback from information consumers (in the case of benchmarking, this is both 
the builder owner and community stakeholders) in order to ensure that information is used 
within existing decision processes. These process steps were not described by the majority of 
jurisdictions in their enacting or design documents. As the importance of stakeholder 
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engagement is a generally held practice for municipal government, the jurisdictions can perhaps 
be awarded the benefit of the doubt that stakeholders were engaged either through a municipal 
climate strategy or targeted working groups. However, without an explicit recognition and 
description of the process it is difficult to know whether certain stakeholder interests were 
prioritized over others. It is the hypothesis of this author that the reliance on the pre-
constructed ENERGY STAR methodology and Portfolio Manager reporting tool may have simply 
led jurisdictions to overlook the importance of engagement as many of the data reporting and 
output functions have been pre-determined. It will be interesting to see if, as municipal energy 
benchmarking policies increase in prevalence, whether jurisdiction will simply base new policies 
on existing policies, and forego stakeholder engagement altogether.  
Finally, there are several instances where policy makers made a design decision which was not 
addressed by the literature at all. Perhaps the most interesting is the mandating of government 
reporting as a component of benchmarking policies. This is a departure from targeted information 
disclosure policies which tend to focus on industrial, commercial, or residential actors. While the first 
generation of right-to-know disclosure policies were government—focused, these are distinct from 
targeted information disclosure policies (as was described in Chapter 3). There are several explanations 
for this novel policy feature. First, unlike the examples of the Toxic Release Inventory or the 
Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation Act which target the industrial 
design and processes of primarily large multi-national corporations, energy consumption in commercial 
buildings has direct overlap with municipal governments who own or lease commercial properties 
within the jurisdiction. Second, because these government-owned commercial facilities consume energy 
just as another commercial facility would, the same business case of cost savings and occupant health 
also motivates government action.  The involvement of government within the policy could encourage 
greater energy reductions and cost savings for the municipal corporation, and improve the quality of the 
policy by allowing the government a first-hand-account of how the policy is implemented and 
experienced.  
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Table 28. Alignment of Theory & Practice 
Policy Component Trend Alignment of Theory & Practice Theory Unmet by Practice Undescribed Practice 
Stated Policy Objective  
Energy & 
Environment 
GHG Reduction Yes 
(71%) 
 Improve a specific and 
measurable environmental 
metric 
 Generate new information to 
support polluters in improving 
behaviour 
 
 Need for policy-makers to 
have additional information 
to craft more effective 
regulations 
 Low-cost of a benchmarking 
policy relative to traditional 
command-and-control 
policies 
 Inability of command-and-
control policies to capture the 
complexity of buildings 
 Allow for the proper pricing 
and discount rate to increase 
adoption of efficient 
technologies 
 Correct for principal-agent 
problems by providing the 
information to encourage 
mutually beneficial solutions  
 Cost Savings for Ratepayers 
 Meet Targets in Climate or 
Energy Plan Energy Efficiency or 
Conservation 
Yes 
(57%) 
Climatic Change No 
(71%) 
Avoided New Supply No 
(86%) 
Economic Cost Savings for Ratepayers Yes 
(57%) 
Spur Green Economy No 
(86%) 
Political, Policy 
and Planning 
Meet Targets in Climate or 
Energy Plan 
Yes 
(57%) 
Bring Existing Buildings up to 
New Building Code 
No 
(57%) 
Improve Data for Better Urban 
Planning 
No 
(57%) 
Senior Level of Government 
Directive or Leadership 
No 
(86%) 
Human & Health Reduced Pollution No 
(86%) 
Occupancy Enjoyment No 
(86%) 
Other Increase Transparency No 
(57%) 
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Improve Building Owner 
Decision Making 
Yes 
(57%) 
Demonstrated Feasibility No 
(86%) 
Operational Costs to the City No 
(86%) 
Deferred Costs to the City No 
(86%) 
Projected Impacts of the Policy Yes 
(71%) 
Adoption Process  
Use of ENERGY STAR Resources and Technology Yes 
(100%) 
 Use federally produced 
resources and civil society 
publicizing to reduce costs 
 Engage a wide array of 
stakeholders in the design 
process, including civil society 
champions 
 Ensure the information 
provided will be integrated into 
the existing decision processes 
of consumers, resulting in 
behaviour change 
 
Standalone Working Group No 
(71%) 
Climate Strategy Working Group No 
(71%) 
Coverage & Implementation Schedule  
Scoping Requirements Limiting Reporting by 
Building Size and Type 
Yes 
(100%) 
 Limit the type of buildings 
covered by the policy in 
heterogeneous markets and 
where there are a large 
number of actors 
 Focus on large emitters to 
increase the impact relative 
to the administrative cost 
 Phase in coverage over 
several years in order to 
allow for institutional 
  Government Reporting 
Government Reporting Yes 
(71%) 
Phased-In Reporting Yes 
(86%) 
Exemptions Yes 
(86%) 
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learning and program 
improvement 
Disclosure Requirements  
Public Disclosure Yes 
(71%) 
 Require public disclosure 
-Use scheduled disclosure, as 
opposed to triggered disclosure, 
to allow for predictable public 
disclosure, and time series data 
  
Scheduled Disclosure Yes 
(71%) 
Triggered Disclosure No 
(71%) 
 
Audience  
Numerical Display Yes 
(71%) 
 Develop different disclosure 
formats to accommodate the 
preferences and knowledge 
of information consumers 
 Leverage civil society and 
associations to disseminate 
disclosed data and increase 
pressures on polluting firms 
 Release of Annual Report 
Graphical Display Yes 
(57%) 
Release of Annual Report Yes 
(100%) 
Civil Society Enabling No 
(100%) 
Compliance  
One-Time Charge Yes 
(57%) 
 Have robust enforcement 
which signals to the market 
that compliance is in fact 
mandatory 
 Actively disseminate 
information to stakeholders 
on apparent accidental data 
errors 
 Conduct periodic audits to 
verify reporting accuracy (see 
Adaptation below) 
  
Increasing Charge Yes 
(86%) 
Building Engagement & Support Yes 
(86%) 
Data Verification Yes 
(100%) 
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 Prioritize data quality through 
thorough verification of data 
each reporting period 
 Offer training and support for 
disclosers on data submission 
and behaviour improvement 
Data Submission  
Automatic Uploading Yes 
(86%) 
 Automate data submission in 
partnership with utilities to 
lower time cost and increase 
accuracy 
  
Adaptation  
Audits Yes 
(57%) 
 Implement additional policies 
to complement 
benchmarking policies after 
several years in existence 
 Implement adaptation process 
to analyze incoming data and 
identify ways to improve the 
policy 
 
 
Water Use Yes 
(57%) 
Retro-Commissioning No 
(71%) 
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6.3 – Objective #4: How does benchmarking advance an understanding of theory 
The fourth, and final, question that this thesis seeks to address is: 
Question #4: How does benchmarking advance an understanding of new governance and 
information disclosure theories?  
Energy benchmarking policies are a multi-stakeholder and multi-level policy innovation which offer a 
useful lens to advance an understanding of new governance and information disclosure theories. As a 
general framework, each iteration of energy benchmarking is a unique municipally-enacted policy which 
requires disclosure of information through the federally developed and managed ENERGY STAR platform 
with the goal of incentivizing market-driven energy efficiency improvements.  
At a policy level, benchmarking is a government-driven imposition which regulates the market by 
requiring the disclosure of specific information. This aligns with the arguments of Pierre & Peters (2000) 
and Fung et al. (2007) that governments ensure a top-down accountability power flow by maintaining a 
key implementation and oversight role, due in part to the monopoly that they hold on legislative 
permanence and process legitimacy. Municipalities set the overarching goals of a benchmarking policy, 
control the adoption process, and dictate the terms of involvement. 
At the market level, however, a broader understanding of benchmarking policies is required. This 
understanding posits that the horizontal and bottom-up accountabilities of, respectively, competitive 
pressures and tenant/purchaser demands necessarily diminish the role of government. Despite the top-
down accountability power flow, benchmarking policies (as a new governance approach) must share the 
role of governing with designated stakeholders.  
These understandings are not contradictory but rather represent a multi-tiered power structure. As 
opposed to Rhodes’ “governing without government”, benchmarking can be better understood as 
“governed governance.” More simply, government creates the rules of the game, and it is up to building 
owners to maximize their success within that arrangement.  
The evolution of benchmarking policies—through the implementation of mandatory audits and retro-
commissioning adaptations—may strengthen the “government” within this form of governance. 
Proponents of new governance contend that governments should look to targeted transparency policies 
when high levels of uncertainty and complexity make regulations difficult to enact or enforce. However, 
these advocates fail to present a vision for a re-engaged government if disclosure succeeds in 
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empowering municipal staff and easing regulatory uncertainty. ENERGY STAR began as a voluntary 
program used by high-performing buildings to demonstrate industry leadership, before becoming a 
mandatory policy which requires reporting by all buildings covered by the policy. Similarly, 
benchmarking policies may evolve from a procedural to substantive requirement; from a policy which 
allows information consumers to voluntarily respond to the information generated by benchmarking, to 
a policy which requires that poor performers take corrective action. This development could continue to 
be driven by policy-makers themselves—as has appeared to be the case in the adaptations implemented 
by the sample policies—or as a result of pressure from stakeholders. 
This continued development is not assured. Fung et al. (2007) identified that policy sustainability—a 
term which they define to include an expansion of scope and utility for information consumers—
requires a strong counter-pressure to disclosers which have an obvious desire to decrease the degree of 
accountability. As has been shown, though, municipalities have poor stakeholder engagement beyond 
the direct constituency of building owners. Only two of the jurisdictions used a defined adoption process 
which engaged stakeholders, and of the two jurisdictions that did disclose a stakeholder engagement 
process, only one provided enough depth for analysis. What was discovered in this one instance was a 
pattern in the voting record on whether to include substantive requirements. The votes were correlated 
with the professional background of the participants (i.e. real estate professionals voted against 
substantive requirements and civil society voted for substantive requirements). Beyond the adoption 
process, none of the jurisdictions were found to have taken an active approach to engaging civil 
society—through the same awareness phone calls and educational workshops that were offered to real 
estate professionals—after implementing the policy.  
Perhaps more consequential than the impact on the policies’ development though, are the implications 
for the democratic process itself, and the “profound questions of legitimacy and accountability” that are 
raised by not engaging stakeholders (Conley & Williams, 2011, p. 568).  If stakeholders remain 
unengaged in the governance process, critics may be justified in their concerns that targeted 
information disclosure policies result in the marketization of authority and reinforcement of existing 
power structures. If, as championed by Fung & Wright (2003), new governance offers the possibility of 
restoring democracy to bureaucracy, the disclosure policy which imposes its own forms of bureaucracy 
must seek to maximize its democratic elements through broader participation of stakeholders most 
directly effected by the targeted impacts. 
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In practice, and despite these democratic shortcomings, energy benchmarking appears to be 
accomplishing its democratizing goal of assuming the decision-making role previously held by isolated 
departments and agencies within government. It has generated detailed new datasets that were 
previously not accessible even to government departments and agencies. However, while the 
importance of integrating new information with existing decision making processes is consistently 
highlighted in the literature, there is no evidence that any of the jurisdictions took steps (ex. information 
consumer focus groups) to improve the likelihood that the data would be internalized. This could 
suggest that municipal staff have a deep and implicit understanding of the stakeholders who they are 
tasked with supporting on a regular basis, or that municipalities believe that the long history of ENERGY 
STAR has allowed for an iterative learning partnership between the EPA and early voluntary adopters of 
Portfolio Manager which removed the need (real or perceived) for individual municipalities to engage on 
this level of process design. If, indeed, the EPA has removed the need for municipal action on this front, 
it could encourage periods of voluntary testing before launching a mandatory disclosure policy. 
Alternatively, the lack of engagement could further raise questions about the legitimacy of energy 
benchmarking policies—and new government theories generally—to truly bring democracy to 
bureaucracy.  
The role of the EPA makes the case of benchmarking policies rather unique in that they include multiple-
level government orchestration. Snidal & Abbott (2009) describe orchestration as an essential element 
in new governance wherein either a state or non-state actor provides “a wide range of directive and 
facilitative measures designed to convene, empower, support, and steer public and private actors 
engaged in regulatory activities” (p. 510). In benchmarking, both the EPA and the municipality 
separately orchestrate actions within jurisdictional lines. It is therefore significant that every municipal 
benchmarking program has selected to use the ENERGY STAR methodology as opposed to a competing 
program. The approach is consistent with theoretical expectations that municipalities should seek to 
minimize implementation and operational costs by utilizing existing resources. It does, however, 
contrast with other programs such as the Toxic Release Inventory or the Los Angeles Restaurant Hygiene 
Disclosure Program, both of which are spearheaded by one level of government which then leads 
implementation. This arrangement can be attributed to the complexities of the energy market, required 
datasets for statistical validity, pre-existing and broad industry support for ENERGY STAR, and high cost 
of entry a municipality to develop a competing platform.  
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Finally, while the literature presents disclosure as a low cost option for achieving a policy result (Cohen 
& Santhakumar, 2007), no cost comparisons were provided by the municipalities involved, and only one 
reported or projected any of the associated costs. Additionally, there is very little non-anecdotal 
evidence in the literature itself to support this conclusion. Further analysis is required to determine if 
cost savings are truly an argument in favour of benchmarking. One question that should be considered 
is: “cheaper for whom?” Municipalities often do not have control over building codes or other forms of 
command-and-control policies to influence energy efficiency. Therefore, the creation of a benchmarking 
policy, while it could reduce aggregate costs to all levels of government, may increase costs to the 
municipality relative to business-as-usual. Researchers must develop models that capture the direct and 
indirect costs of disclosure policies, with special attention given to capture both single-tier disclosure 
systems (ex. restaurant hygiene assessments) and multi-tier disclosure systems (ex. municipal 
benchmarking). 
6.4 – Conclusions and Recommendations for Future Research 
Mandatory municipal energy benchmarking policies are an important emerging policy tool in the United 
States with the potential to have a meaningful impact on the energy consumption and association 
greenhouse gas production of commercial buildings. This study assessed whether the design of 
benchmarking policies conform to the expectations of new governance and targeted information 
disclosure theories.  
Key applied findings of the study include:  
 Benchmarking does represent a coherent form of targeted information disclosure and existing 
benchmarking policies closely follow the theoretical expectations of the core elements of a 
disclosure policy. 
 Benchmarking represents both principal-agent and reflexive accountability that makes use of 
top-down, horizontal, and bottom-up power flows.  
 The stated policy objectives of the jurisdictions do not appear to have a material impact on the 
resulting policy design, even though there are significant differences in the objectives 
themselves. 
 Benchmarking policies differ from theoretical expectations in that they do not seem to engage 
stakeholders fully in policy adoption processes, or consider how the information generated by 
the policies will be incorporated into existing decision processes. This could be the result of a 
reliance on perceived best practices from existing benchmarking policies, and because the 
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underlying ENERGY STAR methodology and Portfolio Manager platform make jurisdictions feel 
that the core aspects have already been determined. 
 Beyond the adoption process, municipalities employ poor stakeholder engagement practices to 
encourage broader participation. This is problematic as literature has identified civil society 
participation as important for transforming and communicating disclosed information, and for 
applying pressure to both disclosers and policy makers.  
This thesis has taken a novel approach by looking at the design of benchmarking policies and whether 
the selection of policy components align with theoretical expectations. This focus on the design of the 
policy differs from other research which analyzes the methodology of benchmarking systems or topics 
associated with energy efficiency in commercial buildings more generally. As a new area of study, there 
are many opportunities for future research including: 
 Standardization of Reported Data: A significant challenge to this research has been the lack of 
comparable and consistently reported data across jurisdictions. There exists the opportunity for 
the EPA or a civil society organization such as the Institute for Market Transformations to 
facilitate standard reporting from jurisdictions with a benchmarking policy. This will allow for 
lessons to be more easily shared across the country, for performance of benchmarking policies 
to be tracked and compared with peers, and for deeper research. Further academic research 
should first be conducted to evaluate the breadth and depth of data being collected by 
jurisdictions, and to assess which metrics should be standardized for future research.   
 Information Consumer Interviews: For a targeted transparency policy to be effective it must 
alter the decision-making process of information consumers. No research has yet been 
conducted that looks at whether the information being provided is valued and internalized by 
the market, and to what degree the policy component selection and activities of a jurisdiction 
impacts the utility of the data. For example, how does the type of outreach, training, and 
support impact the utility of the information. A second example is the type of trigger and 
method of disclosure, such as the difference between New York’s scheduled disclosure on a 
public graphical website, and Austin’s time-of-sale disclosure which is released only to select 
stakeholders.  
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 Cost and Benefit Analysis: Very little data was communicated from the jurisdictions about the 
cost of operating a benchmarking program and how this compares with other types of 
regulation.  
 Quantitative assessment of policy component performance: As benchmarking policies collect 
data, and information consumers have the opportunity to respond, there exists an opportunity 
to compare changes of EUI in different jurisdictions to identify how the policy components 
impact effectiveness. The policy characteristics and policy goals act as independent and 
dependent variables. When additional market and political characteristics are added, regression 
analysis could be performed on policies to find the relative importance of independent variables 
in maximizing the effectiveness of a policy.  
 Benefits of Government Participation in Information Disclosure: Energy benchmarking policies 
distinguish themselves from most other forms of targeted information disclosure policies as 
they almost always require government disclosure alongside commercial facilities. Research is 
required to identify whether this approach has added benefits to the municipal corporation 
(such as energy and cost savings that would not have occurred without the benchmarking 
policy) and improvements for policy delivery because of a unique relationship for knowledge 
sharing between the energy manager disclosing the information for the city and the policy 
maker or service manager delivering the program. This could have broader implications for 
information disclosure policies in general and encourage government participation going 
forward.  
 Network Governance and the Orchestrating Role of the EPA: For energy benchmarking policies, 
the EPA provides significant orchestration through the provision of the ENERGY STAR 
methodology, Portfolio Manager platform, funding for municipalities, promotional materials and 
marketing, and research support. Research is required to better understand the role that the 
EPA plays for benchmarking policies and the degree to which its involved is a key element of 
success.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A - Policy Motivations & Impact Estimates 
Paraphrased summaries of policy motivations sourced from design documents, enacted policies, and self-
reported results. 
Jurisdiction Motivations Impact Estimates 
Austin  Achieving 700 megawatts of efficiency 
savings by 2020 under the Austin 
Climate Protection Plan 
 Have impact on buildings constructed 
before improved building code 
 Lower business operating costs 
 
If all eligible properties conduct upgrades 
between 2009 and 2020 then by 2020: 
 Average energy efficiency will 
improve by at least 20% with the 
least energy efficient buildings 
improving to at least the national 
average 
 Total Cost of Upgrades: $83,600,000 
 Cost of Rebates $33,155,00 
 Cost to Property Owners: 
$50,450,000 
 Annual Energy Savings: $38,593,874 
 Simple Payback in Years: 1.3 
 Austin Energy would have spent 
approximately $313,000 per 
megawatt (average includes 
residential).  
 Average cost of $53/tonne of CO2 
reduction (average includes 
residential) 
(Energy Efficiency Upgrades Task Force - City 
of Austin, 2008) 
By June 1, 2016 80% of commercial square 
footage will either: 
 Have an ENERGY STAR score of at 
least 50, or; 
 Have 20% improvement in efficiency 
above an existing ENERGY STAR 
score of 50 
(City of Austin, 2008) 
Boston  Buildings produce ~1/3 of Boston’s GHGs  
 Climate change causes “sea-level rise, 
high temperatures, and more intense 
storms” 
 Boston Climate Action Plan calls for 25% 
GHG reductions by 2020 and 80% by 
2050. Identifies disclosure ordinance as 
a contributing policy option  
 New York City, Seattle, San Francisco, 
Minneapolis, Philadelphia, Austin, and 
No estimated impacts found 
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Washington, D.C., have demonstrated 
benchmarking’s 
acceptability & feasibility. 
 Assist owners in making cost-effective 
efficiency investments that reduce 
GHGs, improve occupant comfort, and 
reduce air pollution 
 Spur green economy and job creation, 
increase business attractiveness and 
demonstrate innovative leadership 
(City of Boston, 2013) 
Chicago  Buildings produce 71% of city’s GHGs 
and consume $3 billion per year in 
energy 
 Efficiency provides opportunity for cost 
savings, increased competitiveness, and 
improved resiliency 
 Increase the transparency of building 
energy performance. (City of Chicago, 
2014) 
 “High-intensity buildings [use] three to 
seven times more energy per square 
foot than low-intensity buildings in the 
same sector. The potential savings 
opportunity if all buildings achieved the 
median (50th percentile) or the 75th 
percentile for energy use intensity in 
their sector is enormous:” 
o 13–23% reduction in weather-
normalized source energy use 
(total of 6.5–11.2 million 
MMBTU/year) 
o $44–77 million in energy cost 
saving 
o 460,000–844,000 tons of 
avoided greenhouse gas 
emissions (equivalent to 
removing 95,000–175,000 cars 
from the road) 
o Energy efficiency investments of 
$152–265 million 
o More than 1,000 jobs would 
result from the investments to 
achieve these savings” 
o (City of Chicago, 2014) 
New York 
Note: not 
included in 
ordinance 
but in 
overarching 
energy plan 
policy 
document 
 Established goal of reducing citywide 
emissions30% by 2030. 
 75% of New York’s GHG emissions 
come from building energy use. 
 In 2030, 85% of buildings will be 
those already in existence today. 
 While New York has nearly 1 million 
buildings, 22,000 of them consume 
roughly 45 percent of the energy 
citywide, representing all types of 
buildings.  
 Overarching Greening, Greater 
Buildings Plan has projected impacts 
of: 
o Costs of $5.2 billion  
o Saving $12.2 billion 
o Estimates are direct savings 
and do not include health 
savings from reduced 
pollution or avoided energy 
supply costs.  
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 New York’s Greening, Greater 
Buildings Plan has a focus on energy 
transparency 
 (New York City Mayor's Office of 
Long-Term Planning and 
Sustainability, 2014) 
o GHG emission reductions of 
5.3% by 2030 (2.72 million 
tonnes) 
o LL84 will contribute 10% of 
reductions towards citywide 
GHG reduction goal of 30% 
by 2030. 
o Thousands of construction 
jobs “in energy auditing, 
retro-commissioning, 
upgrading lighting, and 
maintaining equipment.” 
o “Building owners will benefit 
from the energy savings”  
o Pollution reduction will 
improve air quality 
o “Efficient energy technology 
and upgrades will better 
regulate indoor temperature 
and lighting, improving the 
comfort of the indoor 
environment” 
o “Lower demand for 
electricity will also make 
citywide electrical systems 
more reliable.” (New York 
City Mayor's Office of Long-
Term Planning and 
Sustainability, 2014) 
Philadelphia  Buildings produce 60% of GHGs.  
 “Best opportunity to achieve the 
Greenworks target of reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions 20 percent by 
2015.” 
 Increased efficiency can help owners 
realize significant savings 
 Large commercial buildings waste up to 
30% of energy consumed 
 Improving efficiency requires improved 
data 
(City of Philadelphia, 2014) 
 
 Bringing underperforming large 
commercial buildings up to an average 
level of energy efficiency could save 
owners $100 million in energy costs 
annually.  
(City of Philadelphia, 2014) 
 Intended to reduce building energy 
consumption by 10% by 2015 and is a 
key component of the Greenworks Plan. 
(City of Philadelphia, n.d.) 
San Francisco   The operation, construction, and 
demolition of buildings accounts for 
almost half of San Francisco’s 
greenhouse gas emissions (Figure 1.)  
 A 50% reduction in commercial building 
energy use in 20 years will have the 
same effect as taking 50% of commercial 
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 The City has established high standards 
of environmental performance for new 
construction. However, at the historic 
rate of 0.8% new buildings per year, it 
could take more than sixty years to 
‘green’ even half of San Francisco.  
 Commercial and industrial buildings 
account for 48% of building-sector 
emissions, and municipal buildings and 
facilities account for an additional 14% 
of emissions from buildings. 
 Documented phenomena in California 
include warming temperatures, 
precipitation disruptions, reductions in 
average Sierra snowpack and changes in 
timing of spring runoff.9 Projections for 
the remainder of the century continue 
to grow more ominous with profound 
implications for the provision of clean 
water, hydroelectric generation, and the 
agriculture that feeds our city. As a City 
bounded by water on three sides, 
coastal inundation is a continuing threat 
to our community, real estate and 
infrastructure. 
 User better data to develop focused 
policy to incentivize building owners 
 California's Long Term Energy Efficiency 
Strategic Plan goal for existing 
commercial buildings states that: "Fifty 
percent of existing [commercial] 
buildings will be equivalent to zero net 
energy buildings by 2030 through 
achievement of deep levels of energy 
efficiency and clean distributed 
generation." 
(Mayor's Task Force on Existing Buildings) 
building stock to zero-net energy, but at 
lower cost.  
 It is estimated to reduce climate 
emissions by at least 64,000 tons per 
year. 
(Mayor's Task Force on Existing Buildings) 
 
 
Seattle  Localized datasets increase transparency 
and provide greater relevance for 
planners and utilities than national 
datasets. 
 “Make building performance 
information accessible to building 
owners, industry professionals and 
policymakers.” 
No estimated impacts found 
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(Seattle Office of Sustainability & 
Environment, 2014) 
Appendix B – Task Force Composition  
Austin Boston San Francisco 
COA Resource Management 
Commission 
Colliers International Director of Client Solutions 
Cushman & Wakefield of 
California 
President Austin Mortgage 
Banker's Assn 
Synergy Investments Green Consulting Services 
Manager Swinerton Management 
& Consulting 
Consumer Protection Advocates, 
Texas Ratepayers Organized to 
Save Energy 
Millennium Place Property Manager Hines 
Pres. CenTex Chapter of TX 
Association of Real Estate 
Inspectors 
Winn Development Associate and Design Team Leader 
Huntsman Architectural Group 
Air Conditioning Contractors 
Association 
Westin Boston Waterfront Principal Cantrell, Harris, & 
Associates 
Specialty/Green Realtors Boston University, Facilities 
Management & Planning 
Principal Enovity 
Central Texas Association of 
Mortgage Brokers 
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Managing Principal and Founder 
Galley Eco Capital 
Enviro/Energy Advocates Partners Health Care CEO Building Wise LLC 
Housing Affordability 
Providers/Advocates Austin 
Community Design/Development 
Center 
First Resource Companies Partner MBV Law 
Real Estate Council of Austin Beacon Capital Partners Founder and Vice Chairman New 
Resource Bank 
Large commercial property 
owners 
Boston Properties Northern California Vice President 
Able Engineering 
Austin Apartment Association, 
Large property owners 
 Chief Engineer of 455 Market 
Cushman & Wakefield 
Austin Board of Realtors-
immediate past chairman 
 Green Building Consultant Simon 
& Associates, Inc. 
Austin Apartment Association, 
Independent Rental Owners 
Committee 
 Managing Director Landmark 
Exchange Management 
Lender/ Mortgage Brokers  Principal Strategic Planner, Area 1 
Pacific Gas & Electric Company 
Lenders - AE partners, credit 
unions, banks, etc. University 
Federal C.U. 
 Vice President Webcor Builders 
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COA Electric Utility Commission  Manager of Engineering Services 
Shorenstein Property 
Management & Construction 
Heritage Society, Executive 
Director 
  
Austin Tenants' Council, Executive 
Director 
  
Air Conditioning Contractors 
Association 
  
Building Owners and Managers 
Association 
  
Specialty/Green Realtors (Austin 
Fine Properties) 
  
Greater Austin Home Builders 
Association 
  
County Clerk (property records), 
Head of Recording Division 
  
Real Estate Appraisers   
International Facility Management 
Association 
  
American Institute of Architects   
U.S. Green Building Council 
(Balcones Chapter) 
  
(Energy Efficiency Upgrades Task Force - City of Austin, 2008) 
(Mayor's Task Force on Existing Buildings) 
(City of Boston, n.d.) 
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Appendix C – Definition of Buildings Covered by Benchmarking Policy 
Jurisdiction Definition 
Austin Commercial facility means a building used for civic, commercial, and/or industrial uses, 
excluding manufacturing, with a gross floor areas of 10,000 square feet or greater. Gross floor 
area means the total number of enclosed square feet measured between the exterior surfaced 
of the fixed walls within any structure used or intended for supporting or sheltering any use or 
occupancy (City of Austin). 
Boston Based on definition in Boston Assessing Department, “a parcel with one or more buildings that 
equal or exceed 35,000 square feet in gross building area, and of which 50 percent or more of 
the gross building area, excluding parking, is used for commercial, retail, office, professional, 
educational or other non-residential purposes, or any grouping of non-residential buildings 
designated by the Commission as an appropriate reporting unit. The term ‘non-residential’ shall 
not include and building that is a city building.” (City of Boston, 2013) 
Chicago The ordinance applies to existing municipal, commercial, and residential buildings larger than 
50,000 square feet, with first-time compliance deadlines based on size and occupancy use. 
Building Size:  Building size is defined as gross square footage - the total number of square feet 
measured between the exterior fixed walls of a building.  This includes common space, private 
space, mechanical or electrical rooms, and interior parking. (City of Chicago, n.d.) 
New York As it appears in the records of the department of finance: (i) a building that exceeds 50,000 
gross square feet, (ii) two or more buildings on the same tax lot that together exceed 100,000 
gross square feet... (The City of New York, 2009) 
Philadelphia Either of the following: 
(i) Any commercial building with indoor floor space of 50,000 square feet or more.  
(ii) (ii) All commercial portions of any mixed-use building where a total of at least 
50,000 square feet of indoor floor space is devoted to any commercial use.  
Any two or more buildings that are served by one common energy meter without sub-
metering, such that their energy use cannot be tracked individually, shall be considered one 
building for the purpose of determining indoor floor space. For purposes of this definition, the 
term “commercial” shall mean relating to or associated with any activity, whether or not 
undertaken for a profit, involving any form of trade or commerce, or requiring consideration in 
exchange for any good, service, or privilege. 
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San Francisco  "Nonresidential building" and "building" mean a facility composed of occupancy type(s) other 
than residential--including type A,B,E,I-1,I-2,I-3,M,R1 and S, as defined by California Building 
Code Title 24 Section 302 (2010) as amended--where a gross area of 10,000 square feet or 
more is heated or cooled in its interior. "Gross Floor Area" or "Area" means the total number of 
square feet measured between the principal exterior surfaces of enclosing fixed walls (City of 
San Francisco, 2010). 
Seattle A structure or any portion of a Nonresidential benchmarking structure which: a) is subject to 
the provisions of the Seattle Building Code, and b) Has a gross area of more than 10,000 square 
feet, excluding parking, and c) Is any classified occupancy under the Seattle Building Code other 
than Residential R-2 or R-3 (City of Seattle, 2010). 
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Appendix D – Approaches to Disclosure 
Jurisdiction Trigger Frequency Audience 
Austin Point of Transaction Sale, Rent Buyers, Tenants 
Boston Scheduled Date Annual Public (Website) 
Chicago Scheduled Date Annual Public (Website) 
New York Scheduled Date Annual Public (Website) 
Philadelphia Scheduled Date Annual Public (Website) 
San Francisco  Scheduled Date Annual Public (Website) 
Seattle Point of Transaction Sale, Rent Buyers, Tenants, Financiers 
(Institute for Market Transformation, n.d.) 
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Appendix E - Display 
Jurisdiction Numeric of Graphical Display Link to Website 
Boston Graphical http://berdo.greenovateboston.org/ 
Chicago Graphical https://data.cityofchicago.org/Buildings/Elevation-
Benchmarks-Map/kmt9-pg57 
New York Graphical http://benchmarking.cityofnewyork.us/ 
Philadelphia 
 
Graphical http://visualization.phillybuildingbenchmarking.com 
San 
Francisco  
Numeric n/a 
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Appendix F – Penalties for Non-Compliance 
 
Jurisdiction One-Time Charge On-Going Charge Other 
Austin 
(City Council of the 
City of Austin, 
2011) 
Up to $500 n/a Fine increased to 
$2,000 if criminal 
negligence 
Boston 
(City of Boston, 
2013) 
n/a $75 to $200/day up to 
$3,000 
Tenants fined up to 
$35 for failing to 
provide owners with 
required energy data 
Chicago 
(City of Chicago, 
2013) 
$100 $25/day  n/a 
New York 
(The City of New 
York, 2009) 
$500 $500/quarter to 
benchmark maximum of 
$2,000 
n/a 
Philadelphia 
(City of 
Philadelphia, 2012) 
$300 $100/day after initial 30 
days 
 
San Francisco  
(SF Environment, 
City & County of 
San Francisco, 
2014) 
n/a 45 days after public 
notice: 
 25,000 sq. ft. or 
larger, fined 
$100/day up to 
$2,500  
 Less than 25,000 sq. 
ft. fined $50/day up 
to $1,500   
Prior to penalty:  
 Issue warning 
 30 days after 
warning post public 
notice on city 
website 
Seattle 
(City of Seattle 
Legislative 
Information 
Service, 2012). 
n/a  50,000 sq. ft. or 
larger, fined 
$1,000/quarter 
 Less than 50,000 sq. 
ft. fined $500/quarter 
n/a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
